Determinants of political purges in autocracies: Evidence from ancient Chinese dynasties

Abstract

Why would dictators purge members of their ruling coalition? Some argue that doing so can minimize the risk to dictators’ political survival, while others contend that dictators who mount purges are motivated by the desire to share resources with fewer allies. In this study, we analyze an original dataset, compiled from biographical data on the subordinates of the founding emperors of seven ancient Chinese imperial dynasties. Analyzing the data with competing risks models, we find that military experience is a strong predictor of political purges. Emperors were less likely to execute officers who had fought in more battles, but more likely to execute commanders, especially those who had established military credentials prior to the founding of an empire. In addition, the incidence of political purges heightened toward the end of an emperor’s life, which implies that the founding emperors were concerned about the security threats against their designated successors. Potential challengers came not only from the military, but also from the aristocracy. Indeed, we find that the blood relatives of the emperors were more likely to experience a mild form of purges: deprivation of titles. These findings suggest that dictators are more likely to use purges to reduce existential threats.

To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

“…We control for several personal, professional, and structural variables that could also explain an elite's likelihood of being purged and punished. Previous research on purges has theorized that the professional histories of elites could affect whether they are perceived as credible threats to the dictator (see, for example, Wong and Chan 2021). Those who served in the armed forces, militias, or state security forces are perceived as having greater access to professional networks with access to the means of violence.…”

“…Bokobza et al (forthcoming) also critique extant literature for focusing almost exclusively on military elites at the expense of civilians. There is one exception to this critique: Wong and Chan's (2021) study on purges in ancient Chinese imperial dynasties. However, their study examines purges in a specific historical context, where the findings may not apply to modern regimes.…”

“…Dictators possess various management tools to keep their ruling coalition in line, including the ability to appoint new officials (Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012), rotate personnel (Woldense 2018) and purge elites (Sudduth 2017). Purges – when a dictator forcibly removes an individual from the regime's ruling coalition – are the subject of a nascent but growing body of research (Bokobza et al forthcoming; Boutton 2019; Bove and Rivera 2015; Easton and Siverson 2018a; Sudduth 2017; Sudduth 2021; van der Maat 2020; Wong and Chan 2021). However, we know comparatively little about why dictators target specific elites or why dictators purge them in certain ways.…”

“…The article contributes to research on authoritarian survival in several ways. First, while most research on autocratic elite management focuses on whether individuals are promoted (Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012), shuffled (Woldense 2018) or removed (Wong and Chan 2021), we integrate this with analysis of how dictators manage individuals differently. Secondly, the article suggests that dictators are careful and strategic with using violence against regime elites; just as many dictators surgically select victims for targeted repression (Xu 2021), they are also precise in using violence against their supporters to avoid negative repercussions (Sudduth 2017).…”

Do winners spread more words? Factional competition and local media reports on corruption investigation in China

“…The recent literature of elite purges in autocracies provides insights supporting this claim. Several studies investigate the targets of purges under dictatorship and find that competent and experienced elites are more likely to be purged by a dictator as they are perceived as greater threats (Wong and Chan, 2021;Goldring and Matthews, 2021;Bokobza et al, 2022).…”