Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach

Prevost, Andrew K.; Rao, Ramesh P.; Hossain, Mahmud

doi:10.1016/s0927-5398(02)00002-6

Cited by 99 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…However, Bhagat and Black (2002) found a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors in the board and the choice of diversification. Prevost et al (2002) and Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) do not find a statistically significant relationship between the presence of independent directors and diversification strategy.…”

Section: Outside Directorsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Marouan¹

2015

IJBM

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of the board of directors and the management entrenchment in the explanation of diversification strategy of the Tunisian firms. In particular we focus on the characteristics of these two opposite directions bodies where the first controls the second in explaining the strategic choices of the firm. We find evidence for the negative effect of the board size and outside directors on the diversification strategy of the firm. The empirical result points also the negative effect of the CEO duality, which is inconsistent with the agency hypothesis.

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Section: Outside Directorsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Marouan¹

2015

IJBM

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“…Mayers et al (1997), Anderson et al (2000), and Prevost et al (2002) suggest that entering a new market requires more outside expertise. We also expect that the number of business lines in a Russian company is positively related to the proportion of outside members on the company's corporate board.…”

Section: Business-activity Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 In particular, see Li (1994), Rediker and Seth (1995), Yermack (1996), Whidbee (1997), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Arthur (2001), Mak and Li (2001), Prevost et al (2002), Lehn et al (2005), Boone et al (2007), and Linck et al (2008). Table 2 summarizes the theoretical discussions presented in this section.…”

Section: Business-activity Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

Iwasaki

2008

Journal of Corporate Finance

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Using a unique dataset of 730 joint-stock companies, we studied the determinants of corporate board composition in Russia. Despite the widespread image of insider control in the 1990s, a large number of Russian companies now actively appoint outsider directors to monitor top management. The findings reported in this paper strongly suggest that the theories and empirical methods of financial and organizational economics help to pinpoint the factors affecting the extent of outsider directorship. We also found that, among potential determinants, bargaining variables have considerable explanatory power. Furthermore, our empirical evidence demonstrated that Russia's legal system and its peculiarities as a transition economy also exert a certain degree of influence on board composition. JEL classification numbers: D21, D23, G34, K22, L22, P31

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“…For example, many authors attempt to determine the importance of a limited number of board characteristics (usually board size and the prevalence of outside directors) for NZ firm performance, e.g., Chin et al (2004), Elayan et al (2003), Hossain et al (2001), Prevost et al (2002), Reddy et al (2008), and Reddy et al (2010). Others examine the relationship between board characteristics and (i) executive compensation (e.g., Andjelkovic et al, 2002;Hurst and Vos, 2009;Jiang et al, 2009) or (ii) firm derivatives usage (Marsden and Prevost, 2005) or (iii) financial reporting quality (Rainsbury et al, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives between 1995 and 2010

Boyle

Ji²

2012

SSRN Journal

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We document, describe and interpret changes in New Zealand corporate board characteristics between 1995 and 2010, a period centred around the 2003 introduction of the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. Unsurprisingly, the representation of non-executive, independent and female directors on NZ boards rose during the period, as did real chair and director fees and the importance of board committees, while average board size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this movement occurred before 2003. However, the magnitude of these changes frequently varies according to firm size, and there are some intriguing differences between New Zealand board characteristics and those prevailing in other, larger, countries. We use this information to identify a number of unanswered questions about New Zealand corporate boards.JEL classification: G34, G38

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Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach

Cited by 99 publications

References 49 publications

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives between 1995 and 2010

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