Determinants of Bargaining Satisfaction Across Policy Domains in the European Union Council of Ministers

Abstract

This research is about the extent to which the policy outcomes in the European Union (EU) decision‐making process represent the policy preferences defended by Member States. Few studies have systematically analysed bargaining satisfaction within the Council. This research uses as a measure of bargaining satisfaction the salient weighted distance between a Member State's policy preference and the decision outcome. This is the first analysis to frame EU Member States' satisfaction using the content of the issues and distinguishing among policy domains. The analysis also includes a substantive number of cases from the post‐2004 enlargement. The empirical analysis shows, in contrast to previous work, that the level of variation of fulfilment in the decision‐making within the Council is considerable across policy domains. The main determinants of bargaining satisfaction are related to both structural and agency factors.

Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union

“…Previous studies of member state interventions found no connection or even a negative relationship between the voting power of individual member states and bargaining success. In addition, they found that member states that put forward requests were less successful in the negotiations in the Council than less active member states (Cross 2013;Arregui 2016). In contrast, this study shows that member state requests that are supported by more votes are more likely to be successful.…”

“…Thus, the existing empirical literature suggests that member states that have more votes and intervene more often are not more successful than less powerful or active states. Even when controlling for the relative position of member states (vis-à-vis the Commission and European Parliament), the extremity of a member state position and the salience a member state attaches to an issue, voting power (or population size) has either no or a negative effect on bargaining success (Arregui 2016, Golub 2012Golub , 1308. These surprising empirical findings have been reconciled in different ways with the theoretical expectation of a positive effect of voting power.…”

“…Large member states might also lose more often on issues, because they simply more often have a stake in negotiations due to their more diversified economies (Arregui and Thomson 2009). In addition, smaller member states might exert more influence on those issues where they do have an interest because they can credibly claim that those issues really are vital for them (Arregui 2016). Finally, smaller member states might be more effective negotiators because they can focus on fewer issues and find it easier to coordinate their position internally (Panke 2010).…”

Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms

“…No significant differences are found in the broader literature as well (Bailer, 2004;6 Results hold if the Commission's position is interacted with specific procedures and voting rules. Arregui and Thomson, 2009;Thomson, 2011: 229-51), although some small states may outperform larger ones in some circumstances (Golub, 2012;Cross, 2013;Arregui, 2016).…”

Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council

“…Several studies have addressed how voting power affects the overall likelihood of decision-making [11,12]. Contrary to expectations, some studies have found no connection or even a negative relationship between the voting power of individual member states and bargaining success [13,14]. However, Warntjen [15] has shown empirically that there is a robust positive relationship between the number of votes backing a member state request to change European legislation and its success probability.…”