2020
DOI: 10.1109/tdsc.2017.2745575
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Detection of Repackaged Android Malware with Code-Heterogeneity Features

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Cited by 62 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…Finally, we investigate how the accuracy of repackaged [19] (10000,100000) DR-Droid2 [20] (1000,10000) DAPASA [21] (10000,100000) FUIDroid [22] (10000,100000) APPraiser [23] (1000000, ∞) RepDroid [24] (100,1000) SimiDroid [25] (1000,10000) GroupDroid [26] (1000,10000) CLANdroid [27] (10000,100000) DR-Droid [28] (1000,10000) DroidClone [29] (100,1000) FSquaDRA2 [30] (1000,10000) Li et al [31] α (1000000, ∞) Niu et al [32] -RepDetector [33] (1000,10000) SUIDroid [34] (100000,1000000) Kim et al [35] (100,1000) AndroidSOO [36] (10000,100000) AndroSimilar2 [37] (10000,100000) Chen et al [38] (1000,10000) DroidEagle [39] (1000000, ∞) ImageStruct [40] (10000,100000) MassVet [41] (1000000, ∞) PICARD [42] (0,100) Soh et al [43] (100,1000) Wu et al [44] (1000,10000) WuKong [45] (100000,1000000) AnDarwin2 [46] (100000,1000000) AndRadar [47] (100000,1000000) Chen et al [48] (10000,100000) DIVILAR [49] (0,100) DroidKin [50] (1000,10000) DroidLegacy [51] (1000,10000) DroidMarking [9] (100,1000) DroidSim [52] (100,1000) FSquaDRA [53] (10000,100000) Kywe et al [54] (10000,100000) Linares-Vásquez et al [55] α (10000,100000) PlayDrone [56] α (1000000, ∞) ResDroid [57] (1000...…”
Section: Review Of Evaluation Setups and Artefactsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, we investigate how the accuracy of repackaged [19] (10000,100000) DR-Droid2 [20] (1000,10000) DAPASA [21] (10000,100000) FUIDroid [22] (10000,100000) APPraiser [23] (1000000, ∞) RepDroid [24] (100,1000) SimiDroid [25] (1000,10000) GroupDroid [26] (1000,10000) CLANdroid [27] (10000,100000) DR-Droid [28] (1000,10000) DroidClone [29] (100,1000) FSquaDRA2 [30] (1000,10000) Li et al [31] α (1000000, ∞) Niu et al [32] -RepDetector [33] (1000,10000) SUIDroid [34] (100000,1000000) Kim et al [35] (100,1000) AndroidSOO [36] (10000,100000) AndroSimilar2 [37] (10000,100000) Chen et al [38] (1000,10000) DroidEagle [39] (1000000, ∞) ImageStruct [40] (10000,100000) MassVet [41] (1000000, ∞) PICARD [42] (0,100) Soh et al [43] (100,1000) Wu et al [44] (1000,10000) WuKong [45] (100000,1000000) AnDarwin2 [46] (100000,1000000) AndRadar [47] (100000,1000000) Chen et al [48] (10000,100000) DIVILAR [49] (0,100) DroidKin [50] (1000,10000) DroidLegacy [51] (1000,10000) DroidMarking [9] (100,1000) DroidSim [52] (100,1000) FSquaDRA [53] (10000,100000) Kywe et al [54] (10000,100000) Linares-Vásquez et al [55] α (10000,100000) PlayDrone [56] α (1000000, ∞) ResDroid [57] (1000...…”
Section: Review Of Evaluation Setups and Artefactsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With these results, the embedded platform is protected not only at the bootloader level, but even in the Android application level. As the authentication process with ALPU chip is only performed once, when the application is executed, there is less overhead compared to the existing software security techniques in [17][18][19][20][21][22]. Implementation is also relatively easier when developing a new application because only one line of authentication function is added to the original application.…”
Section: Articulacy Of the Administrative Policiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, RKP is highly dependent on the ARM TrustZone, along with its flaws, and the system is still vulnerable to ecosystem attacks [18]. Several researchers have addressed this issue, focusing on the different forms of ecosystem attacks, namely privilege escalation [19], advertisements [20], and application repackaging [21,22]. Although most of these studies increase the security of Android, they require changes to the native code and could exhibit additional performance overheads to the end users.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Building high-quality behavior profiles of apps could help in determining the semantic similarity among the apps, which is pivotal to addressing these issues. Recent research [23,24,29,[32][33][34][35][36][37][38] reveals that compared to primitive representations of programs (e.g., counts of system-calls, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) used etc.) graph representations (e.g., Control Flow Graphs (CFGs), call graphs, etc.)…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%