Detection of cyber attack in smart grid: A Comparative Study

Xiao, Junjie; Wang, Lu; Qin, Zian; Bauer, Pavol

doi:10.1109/pemc51159.2022.9962902

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Additionally, a joint likelihood ratio test and maximum likelihood estimator are commonly employed in literature. Although several state estimation frameworks have been suggested under attack scenarios, they have neglected reliable communication and its dynamic state estimation process [29].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Machine Learning-Based Smart Grid Protection and Control Framework Using Kalman Filters for Enhanced Power Management

Dayananda,

Srikantaswamy,

Nagaraju

et al. 2024

JESA

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Machine Learning-Based Smart Grid Protection and Control Framework Using Kalman Filters for Enhanced Power Management

Dayananda,

Srikantaswamy,

Nagaraju

et al. 2024

JESA

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“…Different cyberattack detection methods could be broadly classified into two types. The Kalman filter-based detector in [9] and [10] serves to identify FDIA in power systems. Nevertheless, a welldesigned cyber attack with in-depth knowledge of the system is likely to hinder state estimation [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Resilience Enhanced Secondary Control for AC Micro-Grids

Xiao

Wang

Qin

et al. 2024

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

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Communication-based distributed secondary control is deemed necessary to restore the state of islanding AC microgrids to set points. As its limited global information, the microgrids become vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which by falsifying the communicating singles, like the angular frequency, can disturb the power dispatch in the microgrids or even induce blackout by pushing the microgrids beyond the safe operation area and triggering the protection. To make the microgrids more cyber secure, adaptive resilient control for the secondary frequency regulation is proposed. It assumes that each converter is communicating with its adjacent converters. With the proposed control, the weight of the communication channel being attacked is automatically reduced, and the more the communicating signals are falsified, the further the weight of that communication channel is weakened. The proposed approach does not rely on attack detection and thereby is easy to implement; Besides, it still works when challenged by a combination of multi-attack signals; Moreover, it applies to multiple communication lines getting attacked cases. Finally, the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed resilient control scheme are validated by both simulations and experimental results.

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