Detecting deception: Current models and directions.

Abstract

Traditional procedures for detecting deception are based on the global-signs-of-tying model, with its assumption that certain univenal, physiologically mediated signs result from attempts to deceive, independent of content. More recent attempts to detect deception can profitably be viewed from a cognitive rather than affective penpctive: (a) in terms of accuracy of knowledge, in which a person's success at deception regarding a paficular characteristic depends on the extent of his or her knowledge of that characteristic: and (b) in terms of attempts to personalty inffuence the examiner. Such procedures have been successful in detecting simulation in psychopathology, amnesia, neurological disorders, pain, and other areas. They tend to be situation spedffc and to depend on empirically discovered differences between simulators and persons who possess the characteristic.Pinocchio had scarcely told a lie when his nose, which was already long, grew at once twofingers longer. (Carlo Collodi, The Adventures ofPinocchio)The purpose of this article is to present contemporary models for understanding and detecting deceptive behavior, as an alternative to the global-signs-of-lying model that has dominated the field for many years. First, the traditional model is presented and briefly dmussed theoretically and empirically. Next, two contemporary models are

Exaggerated Pain Report in Litigants With Malingered Neurocognitive Dysfunction

“…This provided a means of operationally defining malingering as MPQ, PDI, or MSPQ scores rarely produced by actual pain patients. This operational definition is consistent with Lanyon's (1997) accuracy of knowledge model of malingering, in which malingerers are identified by virtue of their lack of knowledge regarding the symptoms actual patients endorse. In Lanyon's model, one way malingering can be detected is by over-endorsing symptoms characteristic of a particular condition, because the malingerer lacks knowledge related to norms (i.e., how the typical patient would respond).…”

Feigned neurocognitive deficit: Taxon or dimension?

“…These findings bring into question whether all forms of malingering should be subsumed under the same overarching construct of malingering. Lanyon (1997), for instance, observed that reliance on a global signs of deception model is not supported by the empirical literature. Instead, different types of feigning occur in compensation-seeking circumstances, including the dissimulation of psychiatric, neuropsychological, and health problems (Larrabee, 2003).…”

Construct Validity of the Misrepresentation Scales of the Psychological Screening Inventory

“…The idea that misrepresentation can be expressed in terms of simple dimensions (lying vs. not lying; faking good vs. faking bad) has now given way to the recognition that misrepresentation is better viewed as a multidimensional domain. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the particular patterns or ways in which respondents misrepresent themselves also vary across assessment areas such as clinical, vocational, forensic, and personnel (Lanyon, 1997). However, most of the relevant research has been done in the context of psychopathology, particularly with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1943) and MMPI-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989).…”