2016 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/smartgridcomm.2016.7778818
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Detecting data integrity attacks on SCADA systems using limited PMUs

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Cited by 12 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…It has been known that Kalman filter exists in F i − HQ * i|i−1 for equation (19), with LQG controller, and Kalman filter is Gaussian independent identically distributed [22]. Suppose…”
Section: Q 2 Detector Kalman Filtersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It has been known that Kalman filter exists in F i − HQ * i|i−1 for equation (19), with LQG controller, and Kalman filter is Gaussian independent identically distributed [22]. Suppose…”
Section: Q 2 Detector Kalman Filtersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chaojun et al [18] use KL divergence to calculate the distance between normal and false data to identify the latter directly. Pal et al [19] measure the Euclidean distance between real and tampered data to detect the data manipulation attacks directly. In both studies, the authors use divergence metrics to measure the dissimilarity between two data distributions and generate alerts for anomalies directly.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several methods have been introduced to detect FDIAs. For example, in [19] [20], an attack is detected by detecting the mismatch between the values obtained from PMUs and those obtained from SCADA. However, most events in power distribution systems that are of interest in the context of micro-PMU measurements, last only a few milliseconds to a few seconds.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that, the superscripts in ( 18) and ( 19) denote the micro-PMU from which we started the successive calculation of the differential voltages across the power distribution feeder. Another note is that, both the forward sweep that results in (18) and the backward sweep that results in (19) need some knowledge about the loading at each bus. Such knowledge can be obtained by using the measurements from smart meters; in case smart meters are available.…”
Section: A Attack Detectionmentioning
confidence: 99%