Detecting and identifying response-compatible stimuli

Abstract

Previous work indicates that action-control processes influence perceptual processes: The identification probability of a left-or right-pointing arrow is reduced when it appears during the execution of a compatible left-right-key press (Mtisseler& Hommel,in press). The present study addresses the question of whether this effect would also be observed in a detection task-that is, with judgments that do not require discriminating between left-and right-pointing arrows. Indeed, we found comparable effects in both the identificationtask and the detection task. This outcome is interpreted within a cornrnoncodingframework, which holds that stimulus processing and action control operate on the same codes.The present article deals with the relationship between perception and action and, in particular, with the effects of compatibility or incompatibility between stimuli and responses. Yet, in contrast to the numerous investigations on the impact of stimulus information on response selection (for overviews, see Hommel &Prinz, 1997, andProctor &Reeve, 1990), our concern is with the reverse direction-that is, with the impact of action on perception, We found empirical evidence for such an impact in a recent study where subjects were presented with a masked left-or right-pointing arrow while executing a prepared left-or right-key press (Musseler & Hommel, in press). Surprisingly, when asked to identify the arrow at leisure afterwards, subjects were consistently better with incompatible relationships between response and arrow (e.g., left response, right-pointing arrow) than with compatible relationships (e.g., left response, left-pointing arrow), Our interpretation ofthis finding rests on the assumption that stimulus processing and action control operate on the same kind of-and sometimes even identicalcodes (cf. the common-coding approach outlined by Prinz, 1992). According to this approach, a left response, for example, would be represented and controlled by the same cognitive LEFT code that is used in coding a left-pointing arrow (Musseler & Prinz, 1996). However, there is reason to assume that executing an action results in a selfinhibition of the action-related codes-hence, a refractory phase (MacKay, 1986). If so, executing a left response should be associated with a temporarily decreased sensitivity to LEFT stimuli, such as left-pointing arrows. The

Catching ease influences perceived speed: Evidence for action-specific effects from action-based measures

“…For instance, the perception of biological motion and the perceived apparent motion of bodies are both influenced by the body's own repertoire of actions (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005;Casile & Giese, 2006;Oh & Shiffrar, 2007;Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990); the perception of object features such as orientation and direction is influenced by planned and executed movements (Lindemann & Bekkering, 2009;Müsseler & Hommel, 1997;Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2010); eye movements are drawn to objects oriented in the same direction as the planned grasp (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002); and the detection of changes in orientation is enhanced when one is planning to grasp an object (Gutteling, Kenemans, & Neggers, 2011). This body of research has demonstrated many influences of action on perception.…”

An action sequence held in memory can interfere with response selection of a target stimulus, but does not interfere with response activation of noise stimuli

“…It also predicts facilitative priming for an action plan that has complete feature code overlap with an action plan currently held in memory (see Hommel et al, 2001;Stoet & Hommel, 1999), because only one action plan would be represented (available for selection), and this plan would be available earlier for activating a response than would a more recently constructed action plan. Finally, this selection account predicts that recognition of a briefly presented perceptual stimulus that shares a feature code (cognitive code) with a planned action currently held in memory would be delayed, leading to more recognition errors, relative to when these two events do not share codes (e.g., see results by Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a, 1997bMüsseler & Wühr, 2002;Wühr & Müsseler, 2001; for a review, see Hommel et al, 2001). This recognition delay would be attributed to a delay in selecting the correct representation corresponding to the relevant stimulus event when the two events share similar codes and are therefore highly confusable.…”

“…Recent evidence by Wiediger and Fournier (in press) also shows that motor overlap is not sufficient for CI to occur, particularly when responses are based on stimulus detection, where cognitive demands required for the action event are relatively low and likely do not require the generation of feature codes. These findings suggest that it is not effector or motor overlap, but an overlap in the feature codes (e.g., right or left) that makes up the action plan that causes CI (see also Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a, 1997bMüsseler & Wühr, 2002;Wühr & Müsseler, 2001).…”

Predicted action consequences are perceptually facilitated before cancellation.

“…However, activating codes does not form an action plan; a stage which involves binding feature codes in a manner akin to feature integration theory for object representation (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984). When features are bound into a single event representation -as required for completion of the action plan -the codes are 'occupied', generating attenuated perception of events activating them (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a;1997b). Given that these mechanisms generating perceptual facilitation followed by attenuation are proposed to operate in order to generate action plans, one might expect that this framework would hypothesize the perceptual shift to occur prior to action execution, and therefore that it could only explain the attenuating influences observed in the present study.…”