Detectando el odio ideológico en Twitter. Desarrollo y evaluación de un detector de discurso de odio por ideología política en tuits en español

Amores, Javier J.; Blanco‐Herrero, David; Sánchez-Holgado, Patricia; Frías-Vázquez, Maximiliano

doi:10.7764/cdi.49.27817

Cited by 25 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…(Nockleby, 2000;Waldron, 2012;Whillock & Slayden, 1995). Gagliardone et al (2015) expand the concept to expressions that promote prejudices, as these can indirectly contribute to the creation of a climate of hostility and polarization that can lead to the use of language at the same level, resulting in a toxic spiral (Amores et al, 2021;Guerrero-Solé & Philippe, 2020). In this sense, the Pyramid of Hate created by the Anti-Defamation League is a useful tool for understanding how hate advances through a continuum, as already mentioned by Allport (1954).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Using the base of the pyramid as the starting point for this study, our research used the following four categories as indicators of hate speech: threats, criticism, ridicule, and insults. Many other tools and lines of research for the detection and analysis of hate speech can be found in the literature (Amores et al, 2021;Pereira-Kohatsu et al, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Spanish Political Communication and Hate Speech on Twitter During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Baladrón-Pazos

Ruiz²,

Manchado-Pérez³

2023

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the polarized discourse of the West vs. Russia seems to have escalated to levels similar to those during the Cold War period. The aim of this article, which is centered on the case of Spain, is to discover to what extent communication from political parties contributed to such polarization by encouraging hate speech. To this end, messages sent by the political parties represented in the Spanish parliament, over the social network Twitter during the first 60 days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, were analyzed: A total of 3,186 tweets from 67 official accounts, both from these political parties and their main leaders, were coded. The results showed that despite social networks in general—and Twitter in particular—being a favorable environment for the promotion of hate speech, the communication of Spanish political parties was generally characterized by political correctness and moderation. The presence of the main indicators of hate speech analyzed (threats, criticism, ridicule, or insults) was very minor. The present article associates this finding to other variables such as the tone of the tweets (informative, opinionated), their scope (international, national), and engagement (replies, quotes, retweets), among other factors. It is concluded that Spanish political authorities had a socially-responsible behavior in the case analyzed, reinforcing the importance of public diplomacy to counteract hate speech. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the polarized discourse West vs. Russia seems to have escalated to levels like those of the so-called Cold War period. The aim of this article, focused on the case of Spain, is to discover to what extent the communication from political parties has contributed to such polarization by encouraging hate speech. To this end, the social network Twitter messages by the political parties represented in the Spanish Parliament during the first 60 days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine were analyzed; a total of 3,186 tweets from 67 official accounts from the political parties and their main leaders were coded. The results show that even though social networks in general -or Twitter in particular- are a favorable environment for the promotion of hate speech, the communication of Spanish political parties was characterized, in general, by political correctness and moderation. It is not in vain that the presence of main indicators of hate speech analyzed (threats, criticism, mockery, or insults) were very minor. The article relates this to other variables such as the tone of the tweets (informative, opinionated), the scope (international, national) or engagement (likes, comments), among others. It is concluded that Spanish political authorities have a socially responsible behavior in the analyzed case, reinforcing the importance of public diplomacy to counteract hate speech.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spanish Political Communication and Hate Speech on Twitter During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Baladrón-Pazos

Ruiz²,

Manchado-Pérez³

2023

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…El discurso de odio ha encontrado en las redes sociales un altavoz que fomenta la adhesión y la viralidad, siendo Twitter, por su vinculación con la política, una plataforma especialmente sensible. Así se evidencia en los numerosos trabajos académicos (Ramírez-García et al, 2022) que abordan su relación con los discursos de odio contra la migración (Arcila-Calderón et al, 2022), por cuestiones de ideología política (Amores et al, 2021) o de género (Piñeiro-Otero; Martínez-Rolán, 2021); así como en los intentos, aún insuficientes, de la propia red de eliminar este tipo de contenidos.…”

Section: Introducción El Discurso De Odio En Twitter Y Su Relación Co...unclassified

Polarización y discurso de odio con sesgo de género asociado a la política: análisis de las interacciones en Twitter

Alfonso

Fernández

García

2022

RCom

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

La propagación de discursos de odio a través de las redes sociales contribuye a intoxicar la esfera pública y a mermar la calidad de las democracias liberales. Este tipo de discursos es singularmente virulento contra la clase política y contra el feminismo. Partiendo de esta realidad, la presente investigación tratará de delimitar el sesgo de género en el discurso de odio en el ámbito político. ¿Reciben las mujeres políticas más agresiones verbales que sus homólogos varones, no por su condición de políticas, sino por su condición de mujeres? ¿Concentran las mujeres políticas más polaridad emocional que los hombres en las menciones que reciben en Twitter? A través del análisis del discurso operado con técnicas de PLN para la de detección de las emociones y de la minería de texto sobre un corpus de 3.483.232 de tuits recolectados de 20 cuentas de políticos españoles, se confirma que los mensajes que reciben las mujeres políticas concentran mayor polaridad emocional que los de los hombres, pero no más odio, que es un poco superior en los hombres. También se confirma que las expresiones sexistas y misóginas son empleadas para denigrar a las mujeres y, por extensión, al feminismo, lo que convierte al discurso del odio en un tipo de desorden informativo.

show abstract

“…Así, numerosos trabajos abordan distinciones en la gravedad del discurso de odio (Arcila-Calderón, de la Vega y Blanco-Herrero, 2020; Bautista, 2017;Miró Llinares, 2016), mientras que otros textos se centran en públicos y tipos de odio concretos. Por citar algunos ejemplos, Burnap y Williams (2015;) o Evolvi (2018 abordan la islamofobia; Arcila-Calderón, Amores et al (2021) Un caso concreto que ha puesto el foco precisamente en las diferencias del discurso de odio dirigido a diversos públicos ha sido el proyecto StopHate, que distingue entre tres tipos de tipos de odio -racismo y xenofobia, odio basado en género y en la diversidad de identidad y orientación sexual, e intolerancia política-para poder desarrollar una detección automatizada adaptada a cada una de estas formas de odio online . El proyecto parte de la distinción que realiza el Sistema Estadístico de Criminalidad del Ministerio del Interior de España, que clasifica los delitos de odio en once ámbitos: Antigitanismo, Antisemitismo, Aporofobia, Creencias o prácticas religiosas, Delitos contra personas con discapacidad, Discriminación generacional, Discriminación por razón de enfermedad, Discriminación por razón de sexo/género, Ideología, Orientación sexual e identidad de género, y Racismo/Xenofobia.…”

Section: Tipos De Odio Y Públicos Vulnerablesunclassified

“…StopHate, liderado desde la Universidad de Salamanca, ha supuesto un avance y una mejora en la misma línea, superando algunas limitaciones de HaterNet y centrándose en públicos diversos (Amores et al, 2021). Y con este proyecto como base, uno de los trabajos de mayor interés es Preventing Hate Against Refugees and Migrants (PHARM), proyecto financiado por el programa REC de la Unión Europea con participación de la Universidad de Salamanca, y en el que se busca monitorizar y modelar el discurso de odio contra migrantes y refugiados en el sur de Europa para predecir potenciales crímenes de odio, y del que proceden trabajos como el de Vrysis et al (2021).…”

Section: Propuestas Y Aproximaciones Académicasunclassified

Mentiras, prejuicios y rechazo. El uso de la desinformación para propagar discursos de odio contra personas migrantes y refugiadas en redes sociales: un estudio articulado del caso español

Blanco Herrero

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mentiras, prejuicios y rechazo. El uso de la desinformación para propagar discursos de odio contra personas migrantes y refugiadas en redes sociales: un estudio articulado del caso español Lies, Prejudice and Rejection. The Use of Disinformation to Spread Hate Speech against Migrants and Refugees in Social Media: A Comprehensive Study about the Spanish Case 17 frequently cited report from Gartner Group (2017) mentioned, perhaps simplistically, that by 2022 the Western public would consume more false information than true information and that there would not be enough capacity to counteract it. The year in question has arrived and, although measurement is still impossible, it seems that reality has not met the most alarmist forecasts. The problem, however, is real and its seriousness is beyond doubt, as demonstrated, for example, during the COVID-19 pandemic.Already in February 2020, before the official declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) drew attention to the need to combat the 'infodemic', understanding as such an overabundance of information -partly true and partly not-, which made it more difficult for people to find reliable information when they needed it and which posed an additional risk to the spread of the disease (OMS, 2020). Along the same lines, the Director General of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, affirmed that "[w]e are not only fighting against an epidemic; we are fighting an infodemic. Fake news spreads faster than the virus and is just as dangerous" (Ghebreyesus, 2020).Although the WHO, the media and a large part of academia have frequently used the term 'infodemic', many studies have focused on one of its specific aspects, disinformation (Bechmann, 2020), since the hoaxes and rumors about vaccines, treatments and the spread of the virus have not been limited to a problem of communication and public trust, but have had a direct effect on health and were even responsible for deaths (Islam, Sarkar et al., 2020).

show abstract

Detectando el odio ideológico en Twitter. Desarrollo y evaluación de un detector de discurso de odio por ideología política en tuits en español

Cited by 25 publications

References 10 publications

Spanish Political Communication and Hate Speech on Twitter During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Spanish Political Communication and Hate Speech on Twitter During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Polarización y discurso de odio con sesgo de género asociado a la política: análisis de las interacciones en Twitter

Mentiras, prejuicios y rechazo. El uso de la desinformación para propagar discursos de odio contra personas migrantes y refugiadas en redes sociales: un estudio articulado del caso español

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About