Desires as Reasons<sup>1</sup>

Shemmer, Yonatan

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00078.x

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…On another type of worry, the objectivist claim that S, in order to be rational, needs to have particular desires which are 4 For different formulations of internalism, see, e.g., Williams (1981, 104-105); Tilley (1997); Joyce (2001, ch. 3-5); Finlay (2006Finlay ( , 2008; Shemmer (2007); Svavarsdóttir (2008); Goldman (2009);and Ridge (2014, ch. 8).…”

Section: Towards An Ecumenical Theory Of Normative Reasons 71mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Strandberg¹

2018

Dialectica

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A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.

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Section: Towards An Ecumenical Theory Of Normative Reasons 71mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Strandberg¹

2018

Dialectica

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A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality

Strandberg

2016

J Ethics

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According to a guiding idea in metaethics, there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. This notion brings up two issues: The exact nature of this link, and the nature of rationality. With regard to the first issue, the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim. With regard to the second issue, the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as 'subjectivism' and 'objectivism' about rationality, where the latter is assumed to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons. In this paper, it is argued that subjectivism is able capture an ordinary, non-technical, sense of 'rational' whereas objectivism is not. The basic reason is that objectivism fails to account for the essential connection between rationality, malfunctioning, and rational criticism. This means that we face a puzzle: While objectivism appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons, it fails to capture a central sense of 'rational'. It is finally argued that this puzzle can be solved by abandoning the standard claim about the link between reasons and rationality.

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