Desire and cognition in Aristotle’s theory of the voluntary movements of animal locomotion

Abstract

RESUMODuas das principais controvérsias que têm ocupado aqueles que se dedicam à teoria aristotélica do movimento animal são a controvérsia acerca da forma da cognição através da qual um animal irracional apreende um objeto como um objeto de desejo e a controvérsia acerca da função desempenhada pela cognição na explicação aristotélica dos movimentos voluntários de locomoção animal. Neste artigo, eu apresento uma teoria acerca das formas como o desejo e a cognição se articulam na teoria aristotélica segundo a qual um animal irracional apreende um objeto como um objeto de desejo através da percepção incidental deste objeto e, ao contrário do que a maioria parece acreditar, esta percepção não tem sempre a mesma função na produção destes movimentos. Se o que for dito aqui estiver correto, em alguns casos esta percepção é responsável tanto pela geração do desejo quanto pela sua orientação, mas em outros ela é responsável apenas pela sua orientação.Palavras-chave: Aristóteles, voluntário, movimento. ABSTRACTTwo of the main controversies that have occupied specialists who dedicate themselves to the study of Aristotle's theory of animal locomotion are the controversy about the form of the cognition through which an animal apprehends an object as an object of desire, and the controversy about the function of cognition in Aristotle's explanation of the voluntary locomotion of animals. In this article, I present an interpretation about the ways in which desire and cognition are articulated in Aristotle's theory according to which an animal apprehends an object as an object of desire through an incidental perception of this object and, contrary to what most seem to think, this perception does not have the same function in the production of these movements. If what is said here is correct, in some cases this perception is responsible for the generation and the orientation of a desire, but in other cases it is only responsible for its orientation.

Motivation States for Physical Activity and Sedentary Behavior: Desire, Urge, Wanting, and Craving

“…), (b) for play, which helps to develop physical traits, develop social skills and improve affective tone ( Panksepp, 2006 ), (c) for seeking out rewards, novel stimuli and new experiences ( Schultheiss and Wirth, 2008 ; Panksepp and Biven, 2012 ; Frijda, 2016 ), (d) for acquisition and processing of information ( Parker et al, 2020 ) and other reasons ( Cabanac, 2006a , b ). Aristotle concluded that desires to move and rest are the drivers which “prick” these behaviors in the moments before they are initiated (Aristotle; Shields, 2016 ; Nascimento, 2017 ). Other early literature [summarized by Ekkekakis (2013) ] noted that humans have an “inherent propensity” or “drive for activity,” a need for stimulation or “susceptibility.” Many people even prefer electric shocks over total solitude ( Wilson et al, 2014 ).…”

“…There are limitations with the models from Brand and Ekkekakis (2018) and Conroy and Berry (2017) . The first is that the concept of the action impulse is poorly defined, but seems to relate to a variety of other concepts, including: (a) Lewin’s description of psychic tension ( Marrow et al, 1969 ), (b) the “prick” that was described by Aristotle (Aristotle; Shields, 2016 ; Nascimento, 2017 ), (c) the concept of “wants” as defined in motor control ( Libet et al, 1983 ; Desmurget and Sirigu, 2012 ) or (d) it may be interchangeable with the concepts of states of action readiness (SOAR), action tendency ( McDougall, 1933 ; Frijda, 1987 ; Frijda et al, 1989 ; Strack and Deutsch, 2004 ), activation states or a “specific motive state” in the description of impulsive action ( Frijda et al, 1989 , 2014 ; Frijda, 2010 ; Frijda, 2016 ). Nevertheless, the authors note that, “core affective valence may have a direct, immediate impact on behavior through behavioral urges” ( Brand and Ekkekakis, 2018 ).…”

“…The question of what motivates human movement, physical activity and sedentary behavior can trace its origin back to the time of the ancient Greeks. Aristotle was of the conviction that movement was the outcome of two faculties working together, practical reason and desire (Frijda, 2016;Shields, 2016;Nascimento, 2017). When weighing the contribution of each, he concludes that the "mind is not of itself sufficient to engender motion, but instead relies upon appetite" (Shields, 2016).…”

Measurement of motivation states for physical activity and sedentary behavior: Development and validation of the CRAVE scale

“…The copyright holder for this this version posted September 14, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.31.20184945 doi: medRxiv preprint concluded, "It is manifest, therefore, that what is called desire is the sort of faculty in the [mind] which initiates movement" (2,49,67) Further information about the conceptual basis of desire in physical activity can be found in an article in this same Special Issue (Citation intentionally omitted).…”

“…Even animals clearly demonstrate urges to move when deprived of it, what is known as "appetence" for muscular motion (19). Finally, in ancient philosophy, Aristotle concluded, "It is manifest, therefore, that what is called desire is the sort of faculty in the [mind] which initiates movement" (2,49,67) Further information about the conceptual basis of desire in physical activity can be found in an article in this same Special Issue (Citation intentionally omitted).…”