Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making

Samet, Dov; Schmeidler, David

doi:10.1007/s11238-022-09883-y

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In our setup, this would mean that each player t has a (possibly misspecified) set of models Q t ⊆ ∆ o . A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆ T such that the set of all players that satisfy the following two conditions has full measure: 30 1. u t (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ u t (a, β (t)) for all a ∈ A;…”

Section: Berk-nash Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

Cerreia‐Vioglio¹,

Maccheroni²,

Schmeidler³

2020

Preprint

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We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call ε-estimated equilibrium and prove its existence for any positive ε. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. At the same time, our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973), pointed out by Shapley. In that paper the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria has been proved for any nonatomic game with a continuum of players, endowed with an atomless countably additive probability. But, requiring Borel measurability of strategy profiles may impose some limitation on players' choices and introduce an exogenous dependence among players' actions, which clashes with the nature of noncooperative game theory. Our suggested solution is to consider every subset of players as measurable. This leads to a nontrivial purely finitely additive component which might prevent the existence of equilibria and requires a novel mathematical approach to prove the existence of ε-equilibria.

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Section: Berk-nash Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In all these specifications, D φ satisfies (10) and it is jointly convex and continuous. 30 Compared to Esponda and Pouzo [12], we do not assume that players' are expected utility and have a prior µ over argmin z∈Qt K (λ σ ||z). In other words, players are only allowed to consider degenerate priors.…”

Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 99%