Abstract:RESUMENEste trabajo propone analizar el comportamiento de la distribución del ingreso y la riqueza en las economías templadas de reciente colonización europea para evaluar de qué forma sus condiciones de conformación dieron lugar a determinada configuración productivo-comercial y, a la postre, a la dinámica de largo plazo.
“…These three groups, therefore, are the following: Those countries that exhibited similar types of production, insertion in international trade and resource flows—financial and human—to those of Uruguay; countries that are known as temperate weather economies of recent European colonization or “settlers” (Bértola and Williamson 2006), with a particular focus on beef exporters (Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand);The most relevant Uruguayan commercial partners (Argentina, United States, United Kingdom, France, Spain, etc.) (Oddone and Willebald 2001);Those countries that have characteristics of peripheral insertion, with a wealth of natural resources and, in general, low population density, especially the Nordic Countries (Willebald 2006). …”
Section: Assessing the Effects Of The Collegial Executive On The Levementioning
The world is facing a tide of "cult-of-personality" governments that threaten liberal democracy (e.g., Trump, Duterte, Bolsonaro, Orbán). Collegial executives are a long-established institutional alternative, predicated upon disarming this very shortcoming in the practice of democracy. These are regimes in which multiple people share power, limiting executive excess. Historiographic accounts regard the collegial executive as inimical to resolute decision-making and responsible for democratic deterioration. Despite being used since antiquity, there is no empirical research on how collegial executives influence democracy. This paper tests, for the first time, whether collegial executives are substantially worse for democracy than single-leader executives. The focus is on the only robust polyarchy to have alternated twice between single-person and collegial-executive governments: Uruguay. Using the Synthetic Control Method, the paper creates a fictional Uruguay to compare with the country's real experience. The results show that multipleexecutive governments have had no impact on Uruguay's level of democracy.
“…These three groups, therefore, are the following: Those countries that exhibited similar types of production, insertion in international trade and resource flows—financial and human—to those of Uruguay; countries that are known as temperate weather economies of recent European colonization or “settlers” (Bértola and Williamson 2006), with a particular focus on beef exporters (Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand);The most relevant Uruguayan commercial partners (Argentina, United States, United Kingdom, France, Spain, etc.) (Oddone and Willebald 2001);Those countries that have characteristics of peripheral insertion, with a wealth of natural resources and, in general, low population density, especially the Nordic Countries (Willebald 2006). …”
Section: Assessing the Effects Of The Collegial Executive On The Levementioning
The world is facing a tide of "cult-of-personality" governments that threaten liberal democracy (e.g., Trump, Duterte, Bolsonaro, Orbán). Collegial executives are a long-established institutional alternative, predicated upon disarming this very shortcoming in the practice of democracy. These are regimes in which multiple people share power, limiting executive excess. Historiographic accounts regard the collegial executive as inimical to resolute decision-making and responsible for democratic deterioration. Despite being used since antiquity, there is no empirical research on how collegial executives influence democracy. This paper tests, for the first time, whether collegial executives are substantially worse for democracy than single-leader executives. The focus is on the only robust polyarchy to have alternated twice between single-person and collegial-executive governments: Uruguay. Using the Synthetic Control Method, the paper creates a fictional Uruguay to compare with the country's real experience. The results show that multipleexecutive governments have had no impact on Uruguay's level of democracy.
“…During the first globalization, growth combined the progressive consolidation of the domestic market [87] with an export expansion based on a few primary commodities (over 1870-1879, wool, hides and preserved meat represented 60% of total exports; in the decade prior to WWI, the same products represented almost 70%) [88]. In this period, the Uruguayan economy achieved high income levels; over 1870-1879, the GDP per capita of Uruguay was 90% of the level of GDP per capita of "core" countries-average of France, Germany and UK-and, in the decade preceding WWI, the same ratio was almost 80% [89]. The primary activities (agriculture and mining) represented about one-third of economic structure in 1870-1930 while the proportion of manufacturing averaged 12% of GDP [90].…”
Section: Historical Overview and Reasons To Study Uruguaymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, whereas in the first decade of the period of analysis land wealth represented 94% of total natural capital −85% corresponding to pastureland and 9% to croplands−, during the first decade of the 21st century land wealth was still relevant (85%) but with croplands being the predominant component (46% vs. 39%) and, in addition, forest wealth comprising a significant share (13%). This broader diversification would have had various linkages with the structural transformation that the economy experienced in various dimensions, both in considering the production structure as a whole [89] and agricultural activity in particular [95] and also the energy matrix itself.…”
Abstract:The debate on the relationship between natural resources abundance and economic growth is still open. Our contribution to this field combines a long-run perspective with the study of a peripheral country in the world economy (Uruguay). The purpose is to build a historical series of natural capital and contrast its level and evolution with the level and growth of GDP, as well as the proximate causes of its economic growth (produced and human capital, exports and terms of trade). We show that natural capital has tended to decline in importance in the economy, while simultaneously becoming more diversified. Although this evolution is consistent in historical terms, we do not find a causal relationship between the abundance of natural resources and economic performance. Instead of a direct relationship, the proximate causes appear to have been important in explaining the evolution of natural capital when we consider three stages of economic growth: physical capital and terms of trade during the agro-exporter model; human capital and exports during the period of import substitution industrialization; and terms of trade from the 1970s afterwards. These factors cause natural capital but not the other way around, leading us to conclude that an abundance of natural capital is an endogenous process.
“…Another shortcoming of Williamson’s proxies is that they do not show absolute levels and are difficult to aggregate. Besides, some results appear to be contradictory: the rent–wage ratios in Argentina are increasing at the same time as the land–labor index moved from 29 to 100 between 1883 and 1911 (Williamson 2002, Table A3).Figure 1NEW SETTLEMENT ECONOMIES: WAGE–RENT RATIOS, 1870-19441911=100 Source : Williamson (2000, 2002) and Willebald (2007).…”
Section: Estimating Inequality In the Southern Conementioning
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
