Designing Two-Dimensional Spectrum Auctions for Mobile Secondary Users

Abstract

Abstract-Dynamic spectrum access by non-licensed users has emerged as a promising solution to address the bandwidth scarcity challenge. In a secondary spectrum market, primary users lease chunks of unused spectrum to secondary users. Auctions perform as one of the natural mechanisms for allocating the spectrum, generating an economic incentive for the licensed user to relinquish channels. Existing spectrum auction designs, while taking externality introduced by interference into account, fail to consider the potential mobility of secondary users, which leads to another dimension of externality: mobile communication motivates a secondary user to exclusively occupy a channel, i.e., forbidding channel reuse in its mobility region. In this work, we design two expressive auctions for mobility support, by introducing two-dimensional bids that reflect a secondary user's willingness to pay for exclusive and non-exclusive channel usage, for the single-channel and multiple-channel scenarios, respectively. In the outcome of our 2D auctions, a channel is either monopolized or simultaneously reused without interference, whereas a secondary user can be mobile or is regulated to be static. We prove the existence of desirable equilibria in both auctions, where 1 10 and c 7(1+c) of optimal social welfare are guaranteed to be recoverable, respectively (c is the number of channels).

Cognitive Capacity Harvesting Networks: Architectural Evolution Toward Future Cognitive Radio Networks

“…Although many interesting approaches have been proposed to enable spectrum auction, it is difficult to implement them in practice. Most existing works on spectrum auction are per-user based scheme where SUs need to select spectrum bands to bid and submit bids all by themselves [60]- [63]. As SUs do not subscribe services from primary networks, how could they get the information on spectrum availability and submit their bids to the spectrum market?…”

Demand-Invariant Price Relationships and Market Outcomes in Competitive Private Commons

“…For instance, in the works by Duan et al [2010], Kasbekar and Sarkar [2012], Ren et al [2011], Sengupta and Chatterjee [2009], Xing et al [2007], and Yang et al [2013], game-theoretic approaches to spectrum auctioning and leasing are analyzed. Papers by Chun and La [2013], Gao et al [2013], Kash et al [2013], Sheng and Liu [2013], and Zhu et al [2013] are concerned with the effectiveness of the employed sales mechanisms. The setup in all of these papers is different from ours, as they are concerned with a spectrum owner leasing its spectrum to a secondary party based on availability while, on the other hand, we focus on the second level of competition wherein the leased spectrum is available as a consumption commodity for a specific provision.…”

User-centric resource allocation with two-dimensional reverse pricing in mobile communication services

“…As a complement to forward pricing, in this paper, we propose (user-driven) two-dimensional reverse pricing on top of forward pricing for embracing heterogeneous and stochastic user demands wisely, while reducing computational complexity compared to the auction-based pricing schemes [14], [15]. In this 1229-2370/19/$10.00 c 2019 KICS scheme, a single MNO first asks users to pre-specify their resource demands based on forward pricing.…”