Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues

Engel, Stefanie; Pagiola, Stefano; Wunder, Sven

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.011

Cited by 1,799 publications

(1,173 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…To this end, they engage upstream landowners, residents, or managers and then promote the adoption of selected land-use activities, such as ecosystem conservation and protection, agricultural best practices, reforestation, and restoration of degraded lands (Engel et al 2008;Porras et al 2013). Common land covers associated with these activities include forest, alpine grassland, tree plantations, and agroforest.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing water services in tropical regions: From land cover proxies to hydrologic fluxes

Ponette‐González

Brauman

Marín-Spiotta

et al. 2014

Ambio

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Watershed investment programs frequently use land cover as a proxy for water-based ecosystem services, an approach based on assumed relationships between land cover and hydrologic outcomes. Water flows are rarely quantified, and unanticipated results are common, suggesting land cover alone is not a reliable proxy for water services. We argue that managing key hydrologic fluxes at the site of intervention is more effective than promoting particular land-cover types. Moving beyond land cover proxies to a focus on hydrologic fluxes requires that programs (1) identify the specific water service of interest and associated hydrologic flux; (2) account for structural and ecological characteristics of the relevant land cover; and, (3) determine key mediators of the target hydrologic flux. Using examples from the tropics, we illustrate how this conceptual framework can clarify interventions with a higher probability of delivering desired water services than with land cover as a proxy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing water services in tropical regions: From land cover proxies to hydrologic fluxes

Ponette‐González

Brauman

Marín-Spiotta

et al. 2014

Ambio

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“…The leakage and the associated externality between the districts weaken the e¤ectiveness, and in ‡uence the design of conservation contracts. We thus diverge from the growing literature on how to design agreements for PES (Engel et al, 2008) or REDD (Kerr, 2013), which tends to focus on textbook contract-theoretic problems such as moral hazard (Gjertsen et al, 2010), private information (Chiroleu-Assouline et al, 2012;Mason, 2013;Mason and Plantinga, 2013), or observability (Delacote and Simonet, 2013). 13 Instead, the analysis in our paper is more related to the literature on contracts in the presence of externalities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…They are also favored by economists who view them as the natural Coasian solution (Alston and Andersson, 2011). Even for other types of resources, such as fossil 1 See Engel et al (2008) for PES more generally, and see Karsenty (2008) and Parker et al (2009) for an explanation of the di¤erence between alternative concepts such as RED, REDD, and REDD+.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Harstad

Mideksa

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes AbstractMotivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor's presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation can be legal or illegal in the model: each district decides how much to protect and how much to extract for sale on a common market. If districts are strong, in that they find protection inexpensive, extraction is sales-driven and districts bene.t if neighbors conserve. If districts are weak, they lose when neighbors conserve since the smaller supply increases the price and the pressure on the resource, and thus also the cost of protection. Consequently, decentralizing authority increases conservation if and only if districts are weak. Contracting with the central authority is socially optimal, but, on the one hand, the donor benefits from contracting with districts if they are weak; on the other hand, districts prefer to decentralize if they are strong. The presence of the donor may lead to a regime change that increases extraction by more than it is reduced by the contract itself.JEL-Code: Q340.

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“…These mechanisms were introduced to translate external, non-market values of the environment into financial incentives for local participants to provide ecosystem services (Nelson 2009). Buyers can be the users of these services or others (typically the government) acting on behalf of such users (Ferraro 2001;Engel et al 2008). PES includes as an example the conservation easements for private-protected areas, buffer zones, stepping stones, and voluntary agreements for private-or community-based conservation programs in which certain ownership rights are created in exchange for conservation or the sustainable use of resources (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al 2009).…”

Section: Existing Models Of Compensation Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compensation Payments for Downsides Generated by Protected Areas

Pechacek

Guo

et al. 2012

AMBIO

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Protected areas are powerful instruments to tackle the biodiversity crises. However, local communities believe that protected areas generate downsides for which they should be compensated. We reviewed (1) problem evolution, (2) the idea of compensation schemes, and (3) practical considerations. We found that compensations for conservation-related losses are insufficiently considered when protected areas are established. Schemes include controversial resettlements of human populations, traditional reimbursements, and recently favored incentive payments to encourage local communities to conserve biodiversity on their lands. The compensation process is typically composed of the verification of losses/facts, estimation of costs, and delivery of payments. Compensation schemes promote tolerance and awareness, and responsibility of the broader society while minimizing confrontations. They have the power to mainstream concern about human welfare in protected area management, and are therefore a key to successful conservation. Verifying the impact of compensations on achievement of conservation goals remains, however, difficult to prove.

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Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues

Cited by 1,799 publications

References 43 publications

Managing water services in tropical regions: From land cover proxies to hydrologic fluxes

Managing water services in tropical regions: From land cover proxies to hydrologic fluxes

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Compensation Payments for Downsides Generated by Protected Areas

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