Designing Participatory Budgeting Mechanisms Grounded in Judgment Aggregation

Rey, Simon; Endriss, Ulle; Haan, Ronald de

doi:10.24963/kr.2020/71

Cited by 10 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In many applications, there is a natural preference for projects that are economical. Some PB rules for approval votes treat all the approved projects the same [22,23,27] while others prefer the expensive ones assuming that the cost reflects its prestige and quality [20,5,31,21,18]. We note that even the greedy-truncation rules we studied in Section 3.1 do not prefer an inexpensive project over an expensive one, when both are equally preferred by all agents.…”

Section: Cost-worthy Rulesmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Divisible PB with approval votes has been widely studied under the name of mixing or sharing [11,14,3]. Also, there is a vast body of literature that has looked into indivisible PB with approval votes [20,5,31,21,22,23,27,18]. Approval votes, however, have limited expressibility since the agents do not get to express their preferences among approved projects and all the approved projects are assumed to be equally desirable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings

Sreedurga¹,

Narahari²

2022

Preprint

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Participatory budgeting (PB) has attracted much attention in recent times due to its wide applicability in social choice settings. In this paper, we consider indivisible PB which involves allocating an available, limited budget to a set of indivisible projects, each having a certain cost, based on the preferences of agents over projects. The specific, important, research gap that we address in this paper is to propose classes of rules for indivisible PB with weak rankings (i.e., weak ordinal preferences) and investigate their key algorithmic and axiomatic issues. We propose two classes of rules having distinct significance and motivation. The first is layered approval rules which enable weak rankings to be studied by carefully translating them into approval votes. The second is need-based rules which enable to capture fairness issues. Under layered approval rules, we study two natural families of rules: greedytruncation rules and cost-worthy rules. The paper has two parts. In the first part, we investigate algorithmic and complexity related issues for the proposed rules. In the second part, we present a detailed axiomatic analysis of these rules, for which, we examine and generalize axioms in the literature and also introduce a new axiom, pro-affordability. The paper helps to highlight the trade-offs among practical appeal, computational complexity, and axiomatic compliance of these rules.

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Section: Cost-worthy Rulesmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings

Sreedurga¹,

Narahari²

2022

Preprint

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show abstract

“…An enormous amount of work has been done on the axiomatic study of PB with approval votes [3,1,19,13,5,18]. However, our PB model in which each project has a set of permissible costs is unique technically as well as realistically.…”

Section: Budgeting Axiomsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Preference elicitation methods typically studied in any voting framework include approval votes, ordinal votes, and cardinal votes. These methods also continue to be the most studied preference elicitation approaches in PB [16,3,19,13,12,6,2,8,18]. However, PB is a setting with several attributes like costs attached to the projects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Participatory Budgeting: Fairness and Welfare Maximization

Sreedurga

2022

Multi-Agent Systems

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In an indivisible participatory budgeting (PB) framework, we have a limited budget that is to be distributed among a set of projects, by aggregating the preferences of voters for the projects. All the prior work on indivisible PB assumes that each project has only one possible cost. In this work, we let each project have a set of permissible costs, each reflecting a possible degree of sophistication of the project. Each voter approves a range of costs for each project, by giving an upper and lower bound on the cost that she thinks the project deserves. The outcome of a PB rule selects a subset of projects and also specifies their corresponding costs. We study different utility notions and prove that the existing positive results when every project has exactly one permissible cost can also be extended to our framework where a project has several permissible costs. We also analyze the fixed parameter tractability of the problem. Finally, we propose some important and intuitive axioms and analyze their satisfiability by different PB rules. We conclude by making some crucial remarks.

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“…First, Rey et al [28] provide efficient and exhaustive embeddings of participatory budgeting problems via DNNF circuits in non-weighted judgment aggregation, giving an initial axiomatic study of asymmetric additive rules extended from known judgment aggregation rules. This approach is similar to our own and it proves effective for participatory budgeting; however, it does not generalise easily to other settings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective discrete optimisation as judgment aggregation

Boes¹,

Colley²,

Grandi³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Many important collective decision-making problems can be seen as multiagent versions of discrete optimisation problems. Participatory budgeting, for instance, is the collective version of the knapsack problem; other examples include collective scheduling, and collective spanning trees. Rather than developing a specific model, as well as specific algorithmic techniques, for each of these problems, we propose to represent and solve them in the unifying framework of judgment aggregation with weighted issues. We provide a modular definition of collective discrete optimisation (CDO) rules based on coupling a set scoring function with an operator, and we show how they generalise several existing procedures developed for specific CDO problems. We also give an implementation based on integer linear programming (ILP) and test it on the problem of collective spanning trees.

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Designing Participatory Budgeting Mechanisms Grounded in Judgment Aggregation

Cited by 10 publications

References 34 publications

Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings

Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings

Participatory Budgeting: Fairness and Welfare Maximization

Collective discrete optimisation as judgment aggregation

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