Designing local institutions for cooperative pest management to underpin market access: the case of industry-driven fruit fly area-wide management

Abstract

Area-wide management of mobile pests offers advantages over uncoordinated farm-by-farm efforts through increased effectiveness of pest control and by reducing the need for pesticides. The literature about area-wide pest management focuses predominantly on the technical aspects of these programs, but tends to neglect the importance of social and institutional aspects. In this article the eight design principles for robust common-pool resource institutions are applied to industry-driven area-wide pest management. Three case studies are compared to gain insight about the social and institutional aspects that affect the success of these undertakings. These cases are focused on Queensland Fruit Fly control to underpin market access. Growers face a particular challenge to gain support from town residents, as backyard fruit trees can be pest breeding spots. The paper illustrates that social aspects -such as heterogeneous incentives, social capital and the ratio between town residents and main beneficiary growers -influence the ease of which the design principles can be applied. Market access opportunities impact the ratio of cost and benefits to different participants. The paper concludes that disconnecting the technical aspects of successful programs from the social and institutional aspects in which they are embedded can create unrealistic expectations in socially different regions that intend to replicate these programs.

Balancing collaboration with coordination: Contesting eradication in the Australian plant pest and disease biosecurity system

“…Bargaining and political power are key elements of decision making (Ostrom 2010;Lubell 2013) and Kruger's (2016) study of fruit-fly management shows how biosecurity needs to navigate diverse interests which span backyard growers to issues of export market access, and frequently have collective implications. In the context of Australian response to pest and disease incursions, the 2005 reforms changed where and how politics plays a role in biosecurity -they did not remove it -and removing politics from biosecurity seems unrealistic (Robinson and Whitehead 2003;Farbotko et al 2016).…”

Psychosocial barriers and facilitators for area-wide management of fruit fly in southeastern Australia

“…As Vanclay et al (2006) describe, the social nature of farming is such that social norms are an inherent part of farming culture. Further, if members of the broader group believe that one or two others within the group are not contributing to the joint task, then attitudes and descriptive norms will come into play (Kruger 2016). These cognitive drivers will dictate whether individuals continue their involvement in shared activities because their attitudes compel them to (for gains or altruism), or whether they too engage in social loafing (i.e.…”

“…AWM also requires a significant amount of social cooperation across diverse individuals, businesses and communities, and sometimes across multiple industries that may or may not have shared interests in controlling a pest (Kruger 2016). The joint effort between different individuals and groups in the context of AWM essentially reflects a binding social contract whereby each party agrees to abide by the principles of AWM in order to manage the biosecurity threat (Karami and Keshavarz 2010).…”

“…This highlighted feelings of potential inequity amongst participants, specifically the concern that those 'free riding' the system would still benefit from AWM and SIT without any investment in time, effort or cost (Markwell and Ames 1979). This economic phenomenon of 'free riding', known as 'social loafing' in psychology, is integral to the collective action problem (Kruger 2016;Karau and Williams 1993). Participants indicated that fairness in participation was important to their decision to participate.…”

“…These approaches utilise institutional design elements that enable members to collectively develop, monitor and enforce their own agreed-upon rule-sets. Kruger (2016), for example, has examined the application of such institutional design elements, in the context of AWM, and demonstrated some potential for success.…”