Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus

doi:10.1111/geer.12103

Cited by 9 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…In the surveyed experiments, players are allowed to choose between different rules before they play the game whereby the available rules and the voting mechanism are given. In the field, these things are also often endogenous which may be the next step to study (Rockenbach and Wolff 2016). Finally, to test the robustness of the reported results, it may be useful to conduct more experiments with non-student samples with diverse cultural backgrounds (Gürdal et al 2019), with larger groups, or with teams rather than individual decision makers (Charness and Sutter 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

Dannenberg

Gallier

2019

Exp Econ

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A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Cooperative subjects and subjects with optimistic beliefs about others often vote in favor of the institution. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are identified as the most important barriers. Unresolved cooperation problems, like global climate change, are often characterized by these barriers. The experimental results also show that cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

Dannenberg

Gallier

2019

Exp Econ

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“…In the surveyed experiments, players are allowed to choose between different rules before they play the game whereby the available rules and the voting mechanism are given. In reality, these things are also often endogenous which may be the next step to study (Rockenbach and Wolff, 2016). Finally, to test the robustness of the reported results, it may be useful to conduct more experiments with non-student samples with diverse cultural backgrounds, with larger groups, and with teams rather than individual decision makers (Charness and Sutter 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Choice of Institutions to Solve Cooperation Problems: A Survey of Experimental Research

Dannenberg

Gallier

2019

SSRN Journal

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A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they play the game. In this paper, we review the experimental literature of the last 20 years on the choice of institutions and describe what has been learned about the quality and the determinants of institutional choice. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always implemented by the players. Institutional costs, remaining free-riding incentives, and a lack of learning opportunities are the most important barriers. At the individual level, own cooperativeness and beliefs about other players' behavior can be identified as important determinants of institutional choice. Cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen institutions than exogenously imposed institutions. However, a significant share of players fails to implement the institution and they often perform poorly, which is why we cannot conclude that letting people choose is better than enforcing institutions from outside.

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“…Traub, Seidl et al (2009) test a "social planner", but on pure allocation choices. Rockenbach and Wolff (2016) have a different research question. Observing participants over a whole term, they study which rules participants develop over time.…”

Section: If Additionally Individuals Can Misrepresent Their Types ?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Social Planners: Good Natured, But Overly Optimistic

Engel

Hippel

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractPublic goods are dealt with in two literatures that neglect each other. Mechanism design advises a social planner that expects individuals to misrepresent their valuations. Experiments study the provision of the good when preferences might be non-standard. We introduce the problem of the mechanism design literature into a public good experiment. Valuations for the good are heterogeneous. To each group we add a participant with power to impose a contribution scheme. We study four settings: the authority has no personal interest and (1) valuations are common knowledge or (2) active participants may misrepresent their types; the authority has a personal interest (3) and must decide before learning her own valuation or (4) knows her own valuation. Disinterested social planners predominantly choose a payment rule that gives every group member the same final payoff, even if misrepresentation is possible. Authorities are overly optimistic about truth telling. Interested social planners abuse their power, except if the opportunity cost of a more balanced rule is small. JEL: C91, D02, D03, D61, D62, D64, H23, K12

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Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

Cited by 9 publications

References 62 publications

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research

The Choice of Institutions to Solve Cooperation Problems: A Survey of Experimental Research

Experimental Social Planners: Good Natured, But Overly Optimistic

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