Designing Incentives for Heterogeneous Researchers

Yoder, Nathan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3154143

Cited by 8 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…There is a group of works in static information disclosure which are more applied and aim to understand or improve real-world institutions via information design. Research in this strand includes applications to grading in schools [16], research procurement [79], medical testing [68], price discrimination [11], insurance [29], and routing software [18,45,74,78,81]. A through discussion of the literature on information design up until 2018 appears in [42].…”

Section: Static Information Design Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the recommendation to declare that the jump has occurred is always obeyed, we only need to investigate the obedience constraints (7) when the detector is recommended to keep silent. Using the results derived in ( 28) and ( 33 P(θ = θ ), (79) where the last inequality follows from the obedience property of the original mechanism ρ. Therefore, the obedience constraint for all times before t is satisfied.…”

Section: Appendix 7: Proof Of Lemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure

Farhadi

Teneketzis

2021

Dyn Games Appl

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We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that has two states, one “good” and one “bad” absorbing state, and has to decide how to sequentially disclose information to the detector. The detector’s only information consists of the messages she receives from the principal. The detector’s objective is to detect as accurately as possible the time of the jump from the good to the bad state. The principal’s objective is to delay the detector as much as possible from detecting the jump to the bad state. For this setting, we determine the optimal strategies of the principal and the detector. The detector’s optimal strategy is described by time-varying thresholds on her posterior belief of the good state. We prove that it is optimal for the principal to give no information to the detector before a time threshold, run a mixed strategy to confuse the detector at the threshold time, and reveal the true state afterward. We present an algorithm that determines both the optimal time threshold and the optimal mixed strategy that could be employed by the principal. We show, through numerical experiments, that this optimal sequential mechanism outperforms any other information disclosure strategy presented in the literature. We also show that our results can be extended to the infinite-horizon problem, to the problem where the matrix of transition probabilities of the Markov chain is time-varying, and to the case where the Markov chain has more than two states and one of the states is absorbing.

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Section: Static Information Design Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Appendix 7: Proof Of Lemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure

Farhadi

Teneketzis

2021

Dyn Games Appl

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“…Contracting for information is also studied by Esõ and Szentes (2007), Krishna andMorgan (2008), andYoder (2018). 10 The first two papers are primarily concerned with the provision of incentives for an individual to honestly report what she already knows, while our focus is on a two stage setting where an individual must first be induced to acquire information and then to truthfully disclose it.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interestingly, they find that the principal should never induce the agent to fully reveal what she knows. As in our setting, the agent in Yoder (2018) has to be induced to acquire information. However, the tension in his model stems from the agent's private knowledge about her information acquisition cost and not the research outcome.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Contracting for Research: Moral Hazard and the Incentive to Overstate Significance

Häfner

Taylor

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…In our example, the researcher's type will be commonly known and the design of a (submitted) study will be publicly observable, as in Henry and Ottaviani (2017) or the main analysis of McClellan (2017). Tetenov (2016) and Yoder (2018) study how a principal can screen across heterogeneous experimenters with privately known types.…”

Section: A Model With Researcher Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which findings should be published?

Frankel¹,

Kasy²

2018

Preprint

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Given a scarcity of journal space, what is the socially optimal rule for whether an empirical finding should be published? Suppose that the goal of publication is to inform the public about a policy-relevant state. Then journals should publish extreme results, meaning ones that move beliefs sufficiently. For specific objectives, the optimal rule can take the form of a one- or a two-sided test comparing a point estimate to the prior mean, with critical values deter- mined by a cost-benefit analysis. An explicit consideration of future studies may additionally justify the publication of precise null results. If one insists that standard inference remain valid, however, publication must not select on the study’s findings (but may select on the study’s design).

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Designing Incentives for Heterogeneous Researchers

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure

Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure

Contracting for Research: Moral Hazard and the Incentive to Overstate Significance

Which findings should be published?

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