Designing Federalism

Abstract

Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.

Subnational Governance and Conflict

“…On the other hand, Filippov et al (2004) argued that decentralized national political parties (such as national political parties that have regional chapters and contest elections both nationally and regionally) were more likely to contribute to stable and integrated federations. A third type of argument emphasizes the importance of political inclusion of regional parties at the center (Bakke and Wibbels 2006;Cederman et al 2015).…”

Suspicious Collaborators: How Governments in Polycentric Systems Monitor Behavior and Enforce Public Good Provision Rules Against One Another

“…Governments working together to form and utilize task specific jurisdictions are likely to face similar types of collective action problems as those confronted by governments that together create federal systems, a topic that is well explored and theorized (Elazar 1987, Ostrom 2007Lutz 1990;Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004;Bednar 2009). This is so because task specific jurisdictions are created by constitutions, are often autonomous, and exercise authority independently from their members.…”

“…We draw on federalism theories to develop hypotheses about the designs of monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution mechanisms, or what some federalism scholars label "safeguards" in intergovernmental governing arrangements (Filippov, Ordeshook, andShvetsova 2004, Bednar 2009). We hypothesize that the design of these safeguards, that is, who is monitoring and monitored, who triggers review processes and who is reviewed, and the severity of sanctions, will vary by the types of public goods provided for in intergovernmental arrangements.…”

Federal toplumu anlamak: Federal sistemlerin sosyolojik yaklaşımı

“…Çeşitlilik kavramının, özellikle azınlık haklarını korumaya odaklanması, federal sistemlerin demokrasi ile de bağdaştırılmasına olanak sağlar. 120 Ayrıca, günümüzde çeşitlilik içinde birliğin demokrasiyle özdeşleştirilmesinde en önemli gerekçe, federal sistemlerin etnik çeşitlilik açısından bir çare olarak kabul edilmesidir. 121 Bu yönüyle de federalizm, çeşitlilik içinde birlik ve siyasal sistemler arasında arzu edilen bir yönetim ilkesi olarak kabul görmektedir.…”