Designing a two-stage model for a sustainable closed-loop electric vehicle battery supply chain network: A scenario-based stochastic programming approach

Saeedi, Mehran; Parhazeh, Sina; Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, Reza; Khalili-Fard, Alireza

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2024.110036

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The cooperative evolution process of manufacturer and seller group are analyzed to interpret changes in system stability with random disturbances, and finally examining the effects of different situations on stability through numerical simulations. More up-to-date research regarding the latest research can be found ( Saeedi et al, 2024 ; Ghanei, Contreras & Cordeau, 2023 ; Bilancini et al, 2024 ; Okada, 2023 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing reciprocity dynamics in supply chains of public goods: a stochastic evolutionary game approach

Sun,

Wang,

Lei

2024

PeerJ Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To start with an infinitely repeated game of supply chains of public goods, a stout reciprocity mechanism is introduced into income games to build a matric dynamic equation. The conventional evolutionary game method is employed to propose a model called the evolutionary game for the cooperative strategy of both the manufacturer and the seller groups in the supply chain of public goods. Also, white Gaussian noise (WGN) is added to reflect random interference in the evolution process. Then, a stochastic dynamic system is established, and Ito’s differential equation is used to analyze both sides’ strategy evolution in a game, interpret changes in system stability when random disturbance is added, and finally test the influence of different situations on the system stability by running a numerical simulation. The research shows that the stronger the reciprocity coefficient is, and the system is subjected to random interference, the greater the strategy choice change in players’ decision-making procedures when the repeated game of public goods is conducted.

show abstract