Designing a National Restaurant Inspection Disclosure System for New Zealand

Abstract

The World Health Organization estimates that up to 30% of individuals in developed countries become ill from food or water each year, with up to 70% of these illnesses estimated to be linked to foodservice. Restaurant inspections aim to prevent restaurant-associated foodborne outbreaks while enhancing consumer confidence in the safety of food prepared in these establishments. Inspection disclosure systems have been developed as a tool for consumers and incentive for foodservice operators. Disclsosure systems are common in developed countries; however, they are inconsistent. Previous research has not determined the best format to disclose inspection results to the public while providing incentives for operators. This research aimed to develop a consistent, compelling and trusted disclosure system for New Zealand. The research evaluated existing disclosure systems operating internationally and nationally. The national review interviewed with Environmental Health Officers (EHOs)(n=8), operators (n=109) and consumers (n=244), and findings were used for card designs. Cards were evaluated internally (n=43), then by 11 focus groups (n=68). Two cards, letter and gauge, were introduced to food premises (n=371) in six districts for three months for evaluation. Operators (n=269) and consumers (n=991) were interviewed to determine which design best communicated inspection results. The majority of operators indicated they had not received consumer feedback about the card, and half felt the card was something consumers would use. Less than half of consumers indicated they noticed cards prior to entering a premises; from these data it appeared the letter attracted more initial attention (78% of respondents) than the gauge (45%). Consumers indicated card placement was an important factor in noticing cards. Nearly all interviewed consumers indicated they expected cards at restaurants, take-aways and fish n' chips shops. When asked which card they preferred, 58% (n=38) of operators with the gauge preferred the letter; and 79% (n=47) of operators with the letter preferred the letter. Consumer preference was for the letter, with 88% (n=133) of those in gauge districts preferring the letter, and 72% (n=161) of those in letter districts preferring the letter. Based on these data the letter card was recommended for a national inspection disclosure system for New Zealand.iii

Consumer Interest and Preferred Formats for Disclosure of Restaurant Inspection Results, Minnesota 2019

“…Although the preferred format for disclosure at restaurants was a letter grade and numerical score, this appeared to be only a moderate preference over the other responses, and there was variation by how often a respondent ate out on average. In a study to inform a disclosure policy for New Zealand that compared a letter grade placard and speedometer-type gauge, the letter grade was preferred and was perceived to convey the information in a more interesting manner (8). Interestingly, our study found that respondents who currently work in food service preferred just a letter grade over the other options, which was also consistent with food service workers in New Zealand who preferred the letter grade over the speedometer gauge (8).…”

“…In a study to inform a disclosure policy for New Zealand that compared a letter grade placard and speedometer-type gauge, the letter grade was preferred and was perceived to convey the information in a more interesting manner (8). Interestingly, our study found that respondents who currently work in food service preferred just a letter grade over the other options, which was also consistent with food service workers in New Zealand who preferred the letter grade over the speedometer gauge (8). Respondents who ate out on average one to two times or three to four times per week were the majority of those sampled and appeared to have similar responses.…”

Public and private food safety regulatory approaches: exploring the role of global food safety initiative auditors in achieving public health objectives, focusing on the Canadian experience

“…Of importance to this dissertation is policy development, implementation, and enforcement by the street-level bureaucrat; law-making is the purview of bureaucrats and adjudication is primarily used for dispute resolution (Howlett et al, 2009;Lobel, 2005;Skok, 1995). An example of a public policy solution to a food safety issue is the Toronto Public Health Dinesafe program, a 'name and shame' disclosure system in which restaurants are required to prominently display a colour coded placard indicating the results of its most recent public health inspection; this placard clearly and easily conveys the hygiene status of the food producer to the consumer (Filion & Powell, 2011;Medical Officer of Health, 2009; S. Thompson et al, 2005;Toronto Public Health, 2012a). This legislation recognizes a public health problem (foodborne illnesses resulting from food produced by a facility that does not meet the legislative standard) and the development, implementation, and execution of a public policy solution (the Dinesafe placard) in an attempt to achieve a goal (improved public health through a reduction in foodborne illnesses).…”

“…Food businesses must be licensed with one of the state's food safety institutions to produce, sell, or import food into Therefore, both businesses and the general public recognize that a license to operate a food business in Canada requires the government's institutions and actors to use the process of inspections to ensure safe food handling practices at that facility (Albersmeier et al, 2009;Law, 2003;Medeiros & Wilcock, 2006;Papadopoulos et al, 2012;Rouvière & Caswell, 2012). Trust in this system is further enhanced by the transparency of the government processes through such programs as Toronto Public Health's DineSafe program and the CFIA's list of Suspensions and Cancellations; these activities reduce information asymmetry by notifying the consumer or customer that the facility has not met its regulatory requirements for food safety activities (CFIA, 2017h; City of Toronto, 2012; Devaney, 2016;Filion & Powell, 2011;Papadopoulos et al, 2012;Thompson et al, 2005).…”

“…Food safety inspectors use a variety of enforcement mechanisms, including issuing reports; disclosure placards; tickets; and summons to ensure compliance to the public policy and to promote public health through safe food handling practices (Baviskar & Winter, 2016;García Martinez et al, 2007;Gofen, 2014;Law, 2006;Lipsky, 2010;Medeiros & Wilcock, 2006;Pothukuchi et al, 2008;Rouvière & Caswell, 2012;Walker, 2014). For example, Toronto Public Health's DineSafe uses a "name and shame" enforcement activity which has proven to be an effective way to ensure compliance as the food premise does not want the public to know of their regulatory infractions (Arthur et al, 2009;Erdozain, Allen, Morley, & Powell, 2013;Filion & Powell, 2011;Hirschauer & Bavorová, 2014;Papadopoulos et al, 2012;S. Thompson et al, 2005).…”