Descriptive theories of behaviour may allow for the scientific measurement of psychological attributes

Abstract

Trendler (2009) argued that psychological attributes cannot be measured, as the experimental manipulation and control necessary for the application of measurement theory cannot be achieved. It is argued that Trendler's conclusion ignored deeper issues. The scientific measurement of psychological attributes depends not only upon adequate stimulus control, but also upon descriptive theories of psychological systems and the demonstration of pure differences in degree (magnitude) within attributes hypothesized to be quantitative. For some classes of stimuli, where descriptive theories of the response process exist and where quantitative features in the stimuli themselves can be empirically manipulated, the demonstration of pure differences in degree is plausible and the scientific measurement of the relevant attributes credible. Where attribute differences between stimuli have identified qualitative causes, stimuli cannot be engineered to produce equivalent magnitudes of the relevant attribute. Here is where Trendler's Millean Quantity Objection has force.

Stevens’ forgotten crossroads: the divergent measurement traditions in the physical and psychological sciences from the mid-twentieth century

“…This abstract theory has been held in high esteem by contemporary philosophers of measurement, yet it has had little practical influence outside of mathematical psychology and economic utility theory (Cliff, 1992;Kyngdon, 2013). Stevens, ironically, provided insight into its lack of influence in science when he stated, "measurement models sometimes drift off into the vacuum of abstraction and become decoupled from their concrete reference…A full theory of measurement cannot detach itself from the empirical substrate that gives it meaning" (Stevens, 1968, p. 854).…”

“…There can be little debate that the psychological sciences severely lack substantive quantitative theory, laws and equations, and that there are no scientifically established measurement units, let alone an integrated, coherent system. Moreover, there has been very little mainstream academic dialog and debate about this absence, although a groundswell has been building the past two decades (for examples see Michell, 1999;Trendler, 2009;Humphry, 2011;Sherry, 2011;Kyngdon, 2013). This is attributable in no short measure to Stevens' redefinition of measurement and the divergence with the physical tradition that it did not create, but deeply entrenched into the discipline.…”

“…As Duncan Luce put it, "No measurement theorist I know accepts Stevens' broad definition of measurement…the only sensible meaning for 'rule' is empirically testable laws about the attribute [emphasis added]" (Luce, 1997, p. 395). Whilst the above discussion is critical of such theorists for their complete abstraction of their measurement theory from any empirical grounding, the abstract structures identified by these theorists may be helpful to psychological researchers if re-grounded in empirical theory and experimentation (Krantz, 1972;Kyngdon, 2013).…”

Understanding Measurement in Light of Its Origins

“…Another potential cause and/or consequence of the legalistic nature of the Standards is the apparent lack of attention that has been given in this revision to semantic and (other) conceptual issues. Since 1999, the date of the release of the last edition of the Standards, many foundational concepts and assumptions in psychological measurement have been subjected to a rigorous and sustained investigation and critique (e.g., Borsboom, 2005Borsboom, , 2009Borsboom, , 2012Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003, 2004Borsboom et al, 2009;Hood, 2009;Humphry, 2013;Kyngdon, 2011Kyngdon, , 2013Maraun & Gabriel, 2013;Markus & Borsboom, 2013;Michell, 1997Michell, , 1999Michell, , 2000Michell, , 2008Michell, , 2009Tal, 2013;Trendler, 2009). As will be explored in more detail in the following section, there is no evidence that any attention has been paid to this work during the revisions to the Standards.…”

On the Philosophical Foundations of Psychological Measurement

“…Finkelstein (e.g., [24,25]) drew a relevant distinction between the measurement of ''hard" and ''soft" systems, describing the latter in terms of domains that involve ''human action, perception, feeling, decisions and the like" [25, p. 269], and noting that invariant relations could likely not be established amongst ''soft" systems due to the absence of ''adequately complete" and validated theories. A variety of sub-fields in the psychological sciences (including psychometrics, econometrics, mathematical psychology, and psychophysics) have developed techniques that purport to permit the measurement of attributes in ''soft" systems, but the claims made in these subfields remain controversial; notably, in recent years, a number of scholars (e.g., [8][9][10]12,13,11,19,28,[34][35][36]41,[43][44][45][46][47]49,50,63,65,67,73,77,78]) have subjected the conceptual and philosophical foundations of psychological measurement to vigorous investigation and critique. The conclusions of these inquiries have often turned up unfavourably regarding both the actuality and even the possibility of psychological measurement (for the former, see in particular [44,45,46,47,49,50]; for the latter, see [77,78]), evidencing that the way in which measurement is understood by psychological scientists may be entirely dissimilar to the way in which it is understood by physical scientists and philosophers of science.…”