Descartes on Human Freedom

Jayasekera, Marie

doi:10.1111/phc3.12146

Philosophy Compass

2014

DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12146

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Descartes on Human Freedom

Marie Jayasekera

Abstract: In this paper, I explore René Descartes' conception of human freedom. I begin with the key interpretive challenges of Descartes' remarks and then turn to two foundational issues in the secondary literature: the philosophical backdrop of Descartes' remarks and the notions of freedom that commentators have used to characterize Descartes. The remainder of the paper is focused on the main current debate: Descartes' position on the relationship between freedom and determinism.

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Cited by 4 publications

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“…The distinction between moral and absolute possibility might therefore provide the key to understanding Descartes's theory of free will. But the moral/absolute distinction does not exactly wear its meaning on its sleeve: recent commentators call it “puzzling” and “perplexing” (Ragland , 392; Jayasekera , 534).…”

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Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility

Embry

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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There is a long-standing debate about whether Descartes was a libertarian or a compatibilist about free will. 2 This debate is occasioned by some apparently contradictory claims made by Descartes. In several contexts Descartes seems to endorse a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). PAP can be understood in a number of ways, but for the purpose of this paper I'll understand it as saying, roughly, that free agents can act otherwise than they do (when acting freely). 3 Every time Descartes endorses PAP, he straightaway endorses a claim dubbed by Scott Ragland 'Clear and Distinct Determinism' (CDD). According to CDD, if an agent S has a clear and distinct perception that x is true (or good), S cannot refrain from endorsing (or pursuing) x. 4 To the extent that one emphasizes Descartes's endorsements of PAP, Descartes looks like a libertarian; to the extent that one emphasizes Descartes's endorsements of CDD, Descartes looks like a compatibilist (given, of course, his clear commitment to free will).In a letter (allegedly) 5 to Mesland (AT IV, 173 / CSMK 245) Descartes claims that in the face of a clear and distinct perception, "absolutely speaking" we are able to refrain from pursuing the good or affirming the truth perceived, but "morally speaking" we are "hardly" able to so refrain. This claim suggests that PAP and CDD should be read with two senses of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

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“… For an introduction to the literature, see Jayasekera (); for something more thorough and opinionated, see Ragland (). …”

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Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility

Embry

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Irresolution and Other Weaknesses of Soul in Descartes

Homan

2024

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

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This paper contributes to a better understanding of Cartesian irresolution by clarifying its relation to akrasia and wantonness. It argues that irresolution (qua passion) is the same as neither akrasia nor wantonness, but is, like them, a kind of weakness of soul. If akrasia consists in having what Descartes calls ‘firm and decisive judgments’ (F&D judgments) but failing to act on them, and wantonness consists in not having any F&D judgments at all, but acting completely at the behest of the passions, then irresolution can be understood as a state between akrasia and wantonness: the irresolute lacks F&D judgments (like the wanton) but (unlike the wanton) actively strives to attain them.

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Imagining Oneself as Forming a Whole with Others: Descartes’s View of Love

Tate

2021

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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Descartes on Human Freedom

Cited by 4 publications

References 31 publications

Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility

Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility

Irresolution and Other Weaknesses of Soul in Descartes

Imagining Oneself as Forming a Whole with Others: Descartes’s View of Love

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