Descartes&amp;#x2019;s Anti-Transparency and the Need for Radical Doubt

Paul, Elliot Samuel

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.041

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(32 reference statements)

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“…69 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of Modern Philosophy for pressing me to clarify this point. 70 See, for example, Paul (2018Paul ( : 1117.…”

Section: Taking Stockmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Am I? Descartes’s Various Ways of Considering the Self

Chamberlain

2020

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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In the Meditations and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self's properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication-the selfis both simple and composite, which is contradictory. In response to this objection, this paper develops a reading of Descartes's various ways of considering the self. I argue that the best reading of Descartes's qualified claims about the self, i.e., about the self qua mind or the self qua human being, presupposes an account of the unqualified self, that is, of the self simpliciter. I argue that the self simpliciter is not a mind, and that it is not a human being either. This result might suggest the pessimistic conclusion that Descartes's view of the self is incoherent. To avoid this result, I introduce a new metaphysical account of the Cartesian self. On my view, the self is individuated by a unified mental life. The self is constituted by the beings that jointly produce this mental life, and derives its unity from it.

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“…69 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of Modern Philosophy for pressing me to clarify this point. 70 See, for example, Paul (2018Paul ( : 1117.…”

Section: Taking Stockmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Am I? Descartes’s Various Ways of Considering the Self

Chamberlain

2020

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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“…While it is not uncommon that the mind's knowledge of itselfeither of its existence or its essenceis seen as enjoying a special status as certain knowledge, there are in fact few that take that certainty to follow from consciousness in particular. As noted above in the section "Consciousness and Thinking," Descartes is often credited with ascribing remarkable epistemic achievements to consciousness, but he forwards no explicit argument that they are due to consciousness specifically (it is rather his method of systematic doubt that is designed lead us to clear and distinct ideas; see Paul 2018). In contrast, Arnauld, a self-proclaimed Cartesian, explicitly attributes certainty to conscious mental states, "I do not think without knowing that I think; I do not know a square without knowing that I know it; I do not see the sun, or, to express this so that it is beyond doubt, I do not imagine seeing the sun without being certain that I imagine seeing it" (Arnauld 1683(Arnauld /1990.…”

Section: Consciousness and Certaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness in Early Modern Philosophy and Science

Lähteenmäki¹

2020

Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences

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“…And in fact it would be difficult to find anyone in the history of philosophy who does deny this, perhaps not even Descartes. SeePaul (2018 ) for arguments against the dominant reading of Descartes as the 'high priest of Transparency' (1123), arguing instead that for Descartes, consciousness (of one's thoughts) does not deliver self-knowledge .Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqae074/7705875 by guest on 04 July 2024…”

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confidence: 99%

Moral psychology as soul-picture

Russell

2024

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Iris Murdoch offers a distinctive conception of moral psychology. She suggests that to develop a moral psychology is to develop what she calls a soul-picture; different philosophical moral psychologies are, as she puts it, ‘rival soul-pictures’. In this paper, I clarify Murdoch's generic notion of ‘soul-picture’, the genus of which, for example, Aristotle's, Kant's, Nietzsche's, and Murdoch's constitute rival species. Are all philosophical moral psychologies soul-pictures? If not, what are the criteria that a moral psychology must meet in order to qualify as a soul-picture? I propose five key dimensions. A soul-picture provides a picture of the soul or self, that is (1) holistic, (2) value-rich and psychologically realistic (for Murdoch these are intertwined), (3) reflexive, (4) therapeutic, and (5) the articulation of which makes use of imaginative language.

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Descartes’s Anti-Transparency and the Need for Radical Doubt

Cited by 4 publications

References 28 publications

What Am I? Descartes’s Various Ways of Considering the Self

What Am I? Descartes’s Various Ways of Considering the Self

Consciousness in Early Modern Philosophy and Science

Moral psychology as soul-picture

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