Der Rückschaufehler bei Kindern und Erwachsenen

Pohl, Rüdiger; Haracic, Irma

doi:10.1026/0049-8637.37.1.46

Cited by 12 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Despite the substantial literature on hindsight bias that exists for adults, there has been little work on the developmental origins and trajectory of hindsight bias (but see Bernstein et al, 2004;Birch & Bernstein, 2007;Pohl & Haracic, 2005). This stands in stark contrast to the domain of theory of mind in which research has focused on developmental issues.…”

Section: Hindsight Biasmentioning

confidence: 84%

Hindsight Bias and Developing Theories of Mind

et al. 2007

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Although hindsight bias (the ''I knew it all along'' phenomenon) has been documented in adults, its development has not been investigated. This is despite the fact that hindsight bias errors closely resemble the errors children make on theory of mind (ToM) tasks. Two main goals of the present work were to (a) create a battery of hindsight tasks for preschoolers, and (b) assess the relation between children's performance on these and ToM tasks. In two experiments involving 144 preschoolers, 3-, 4-, and 5-year olds exhibited strong hindsight bias. Performance on hindsight and ToM tasks was significantly correlated independent of age, language ability, and inhibitory control. These findings contribute to a more comprehensive account of perspective taking across the lifespan.

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Section: Hindsight Biasmentioning

confidence: 84%

Hindsight Bias and Developing Theories of Mind

et al. 2007

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“…As for children, given that the curse of knowledge appears to be stronger earlier in development (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2003;Pohl & Haracic, 2005), it follows that younger children's performance on false-belief tasks would be more compromised than older children's and adults' performance. Note also that although we tested adults' curse-of-knowledge bias only in a displacement task (one of the tasks most commonly used to assess children's false-belief reasoning), the same logic can apply to a number of difficulties in mental-state reasoning when the subject has specific knowledge, such as the difficulties young children experience in unexpected-contents tasks (e.g., Perner et al, 1987), appearance-reality tasks (e.g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988), and source-of-information tasks (e.g., Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In earlier work (Birch & Bloom, 2003), we showed that 3-and 4-year-olds are more susceptible than 5-year-olds to a cognitive bias found in adults, the curse of knowledge (see also Bernstein, Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004;Pohl & Haracic, 2005). We adopted this term from Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber (1989) and use it to refer to the tendency to be biased by one's own current knowledge state when trying to appreciate a more naive perspective, whether that more naive perspective is one's own earlier perspective (as in the hindsight bias) or someone else's perspective (see Birch & Bernstein, 2007, for a discussion).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning About False Beliefs

2007

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ABSTRACT-Assessing what other people know and believe is critical for accurately understanding human action. Young children find it difficult to reason about false beliefs (i.e., beliefs that conflict with reality). The source of this difficulty is a matter of considerable debate. Here we show that if sensitive-enough measures are used, adults show deficits in a false-belief task similar to one used with young children. In particular, we show a curse-of-knowledge bias in false-belief reasoning. That is, adults' own knowledge of an event's outcome can compromise their ability to reason about another person's beliefs about that event. We also found that adults' perception of the plausibility of an event mediates the extent of this bias. These findings shed light on the factors involved in false-belief reasoning and are discussed in light of their implications for both adults' and children's social cognition.Reasoning about what other people believe is often essential for predicting and interpreting human action. A wealth of research has investigated children's appreciation that the mind can misrepresent reality-that is, their appreciation that people can hold false beliefs. Most research on children's false-belief reasoning has utilized some variant of the displacement task (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985;Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For example, subjects are told a story about Sally, who puts her candy in a box and leaves the room. In her absence, another character moves the candy to a basket. When Sally returns, where will she look for her candy? The right answer, that she will look in the box, requires attributing a false belief to Sally. Fouryear-olds tend to do fairly well at such tasks, but younger children tend to fail (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson's, 2001, meta-analysis). Younger children tend to answer in accord with their own knowledge, saying that Sally will think the candy is in the basket.The source of children's difficulty is a matter of considerable debate. Some researchers interpret children's difficulties on these tasks as reflecting a conceptual deficit: Perhaps young children lack a concept of belief or a concept of mental representation more generally (e.g., Gopnik, 1993;Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987;Wellman, 1990;Wellman et al., 2001). An alternative view is that young children's problems are due to more general cognitive factors such as memory and processing limitations, and thus not necessarily indicative of a conceptual limitation (e.g., Fodor, 1992;German & Leslie, 2000;Leslie, 1987;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;Roth & Leslie, 1998;Zaitchik, 1990; for a discussion, see Bloom & German, 2000).According to one version of this alternative, children have the same bias in perspective taking as adults, only to a greater extent. In earlier work (Birch & Bloom, 2003), we showed that 3-and 4-year-olds are more susceptible than 5-year-olds to a cognitive bias found in adults, the curse of knowledge (see also Bernstein, Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004;Pohl & Haracic, 2005). We adopted this term f...

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“…For instance, Pohl and Haracic (2005) asked fourth, sixth, and eighth graders, as well as adults, to estimate the answers to difficult numerical knowledge questions. They were also provided with a value and told it was someone else's estimate, either a teacher's or a peer's, and were told not to let the other person's estimate influence their own.…”

Section: Changes In Hindsight Bias Across Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%