Depth psychology and self-deception

Abstract

This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depthpsychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception-in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose-or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception-the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception-not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches.There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause.

Three Recent Frankfurt Cases

“…The interpretation we are entertaining is that, pace the 'non-moral' claims, we are meant to see Joe as having some highly dissociated, prior, purely moral decision-point as to whether to functionally, prosthetically, bring before his imagination the non-moral considerations that he realises can alone move him (though cf. Mele (1997Mele ( , 2001 and Lockie (2003)-the static and dynamic paradoxes of self-deception). Might this be what is meant by the otherwise odd claim (in light of the 'non-moral' stipulation) that Joe is nevertheless "aware and sensitive to the moral reasons not to evade taxes in the way he is contemplating"?…”

Realism, Self-Deception and the Logical Paradox of Repression

“…The difficulties faced by the concept of repression are not isolated to psychoanalytic theory, but occur with respect to 'self-deception' generally, of which repression is commonly conceived of as a variety (e.g. S. Cohen, 2001;Fingarette, 1969;Johnson, 1998;Lockie, 2003;Nesse, 1990;Neu, 1988;Slavin, 1985Slavin, , 1990Slavin & Grief, 1995). Johnson (1998), for example, writes that 'repression' is 'a kind of self-deception in which people hide painful information about themselves from themselves' (p. 300).…”

Self-deception in and out of illness: are some subjects responsible for their delusions?

“…12 I am not sure that Mele succeeds in avoiding the dynamical problem, which is part of the reason why I think we need to go further and deny the constitutive connection thesis, that is, move to talking not about belief formation but about the dynamics of belief maintenance. For critical discussion of Mele and the dynamical problem see Lockie (2003). 13 There is thus an affinity between my view and Fingarette's (1969).…”