Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges

Abstract

By October 2004, the United States will have begun initial deployment of a missile defense capability-albeit a modest, limited, and not completely proven one-to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack.The gradual phase-in of ballistic missile defense deployments will mark an important change in the policy context of the missile defense issue. Past debate focused on whether missile defenses should be deployed and whether they would work. These issues will now share the limelight with another pressing question: how would missile defenses actually be used? Operating a missile defense system presents seven challenges: To manage the transition to defense, policy guidance to address these challenges will have to be somewhat flexible; it will likely evolve over time, based on the evolution of the system as well as operational experience and future testing using varied assumptions and scenarios.If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2004, the United States will deploy eight groundbased midcourse defense (GMD) interceptors 1 in Alaska and California, along with land-, sea-, and space-based sensors and the command and control systems to support the interceptors. By the end of 2005, 12 more GMD interceptors will be added, along with additional sensors and interceptor missiles on Navy ships.The initial deployments of 2004-2005 are only the first step on the path to the Bush administration goal of an integrated, global missile defense 2 to protect the United States, its friends and allies, and deployed forces against limited attacks by ballistic missiles of all ranges (short-, medium-, intermediate-, and longrange) in all phases of flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal).

The Obama administration's phased-adaptive architecture: technological, operational and political issues

“…If a hostile power launches a ballistic missile at two different targets, perhaps in two countries, who makes the decision which missile to intercept and based on what criteria? 34 Israeli missile defense doctrine relies on early calculation of a ballistic missile's probable impact point to inform decisions about which threats to intercept and which to ignore since they will land harmlessly in open spaces. A similar thorny issue is posed by a successful intercept.…”