I propose human rights as self-authored through a personality structure of "assertive selfhood." To that end I identify three features of self-authorship: emergent through collective political action; as a critical stance; and borne by nonidiosyncratic norms. So conceived, human rights require a field of recognition as a social structure supportive of claims to assertive selfhood. I show that the capacity to self-grant depends critically on the participant's personality structure as well as on the structure of some of the social institutions he or she inhabits. But like any political vision, the project for self-granted human rights has distinct limits, above all with respect to the many inequalities among potential self-authors.We have no evidence that human rights exist independently of human imagination and social constructions, which is to say: no evidence that humans are endowed with pre-political, universally valid rights a priori. Why anyone might hope for such evidence is obvious: it might endow the human-rights idea with moral objectivity and universal validity. At the same time it would relieve humans of the burden of moral invention (and what might weigh more heavily than providing for the moral welfare of all others?). Most efforts to provide such evidence claim a theological or metaphysical origin. They have never worked. This is still an issue because those efforts are again and again renewed instead of abandoned. But if, as I propose, Theor Soc (2010) 39:631-650