Deontological dissonance and the consequentialist crutch.

Ditto, Peter H.; Liu, Brittany

doi:10.1037/13091-003

“…In addition, recent research shows that explicit reasoning does not always enhance accuracy (Kool, Cushman & Gershman, ) and in fact in some cases may interfere (Gaissmaier & Schooler, ). These problems are further aggravated by evidence that outcome‐based assessments are not insulated from processes of motivated reasoning (Ditto & Liu, ). So debates about utility maximization may to some degree constitute attempts to align facts with personal goals and values.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We did not anticipate this result, which deserves further investigation. Possibly, our outcome items index the recognition that outcomes matter in the abstract, which is not cognitively demanding or ambiguous (see Ditto & Liu, ). Rather, cognitive demands and ambiguity may arise principally in the process of making outcome‐based moral judgments in practice.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment

Hannikainen

¹

,

Miller

²

,

Cushman

³

2017

Ratio

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Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive feature of conservative morality. Next, we find that the conservative and liberal structural approaches to moral judgment are associated with their corresponding patterns of reliance on distinct moral foundations. In addition, the structural approach uniquely predicts that conservatives will be more opposed to harm in circumstances like the wellknown trolley problem, a result which we replicate. Finally, we show that the structural approaches of conservatives and liberals are partly linked to underlying cognitive styles (intuitive versus deliberative). Collectively, these findings forge a link between two important yet previously independent lines of research in political psychology: cognitive style and moral foundations theory.

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“…We did not anticipate this result, which deserves further investigation. Possibly, our outcome items index the recognition that outcomes matter in the abstract, which is not cognitively demanding or ambiguous (see Ditto & Liu, 2012). Rather, cognitive demands and ambiguity may arise principally in the process of making outcomebased moral judgments in practice.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, recent research shows that explicit reasoning does not always enhance accuracy (Kool, Cushman & Gershman, 2016) and in fact in some cases may interfere (Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008). These problems are further aggravated by evidence that outcome-based assessments are not insulated from processes of motivated reasoning (Ditto & Liu, 2012). So debates about utility maximization may to some degree constitute attempts to align facts with personal goals and values.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Act versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment

Hannikainen

¹

,

Miller²,

Cushman

³

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive feature of conservative morality. Next, we find that the conservative and liberal structural approaches to moral judgment are associated with their corresponding patterns of reliance on distinct moral foundations. In addition, the structural approach uniquely predicts that conservatives will be more opposed to harm in circumstances like the wellknown trolley problem, a result which we replicate. Finally, we show that the structural approaches of conservatives and liberals are partly linked to underlying cognitive styles (intuitive versus deliberative). Collectively, these findings forge a link between two important yet previously independent lines of research in political psychology: cognitive style and moral foundations theory.

show abstract

“…Persons might justify their own actions or the actions of others and then compare them with their long-held moral standards, which also involves appraisals (Kuhn, 1989;Nisbett & Ross, 1980). These appraisals are in the form of moral reasoning that can take place unconsciously and be contaminated by bias or errors (Ditto & Liu, 2012;Kestner, 2009). …”

Section: Moral Judgmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief in a Just World and Judgment in Moral Dilemmas

Chaturapanich¹,

Chaiwutikornwanich²

2015

ASS

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This paper addresses the influence of belief in a just world on moral judgment using moral dilemmas by observing the interactions with the following independent variables: 1) dual-process cognitions (automatic or deliberate), 2) the protagonist's fate (bad, good, or absent), and 3) the type of dilemma (life-threatening or not). The results found no effects of belief in a just world on moral judgments. But an interaction between the protagonist's fate and the dilemma type emerged as significant. In Study 1, the protagonist was identified as a victim, the participants accepted moral violations against the bad fate victim to a greater extent in the life-threatening situation (turning the car to crash into one man in order to save five men) than in the non-life-threatening situation (choosing an employee for dismissal to save the company's financial status). In Study 2, the protagonist was specified as an offender. The participants accepted the violations against the good fate offender to a greater extent in the non-life-threatening than in the life-threatening situation. Meanwhile, the participants in the control groups (for whom the protagonist was not affected by fate) of both studies exhibited greater acceptance of moral violations in the non-life-threatening than the life-threatening situations.

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Deontological dissonance and the consequentialist crutch.

Abstract: People have moral beliefs. By that we mean that people believe that some things are

Cited by 18 publications

References 70 publications

Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment

Act Versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment

Act versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment

Belief in a Just World and Judgment in Moral Dilemmas

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