Denunciation and Social Control

Abstract

It has long been observed that centralized social control requires some level of cooperation from the populace. Without such assistance, control agents are unable to acquire the local knowledge necessary to locate and prosecute deviants. Yet why citizens cooperate with authorities, especially in the most repressive regimes, remains a puzzle. This article develops two models of such cooperation: in the first, authorities actively use incentives to elicit denunciations from the populace, through either coercion or the promise of rewards. In the second, authorities passively gain access to local negative networks, as individuals denounce to harm others whom they dislike and to gain relative to them. Using internal variation in the early years of the Spanish Inquisition (1486 to 1502) and Romanov Russia (1613 to 1649), I demonstrate the differing effects of each model on patterns of denunciations. Paradoxically, social control is most effective when authorities provide individuals maximum freedom to direct its coercive power.

Getting to Know You: Welfare Fraud Investigation and the Appropriation of Social Ties

“…This depiction parallels Bergemann’s (2017) finding that proximity in geography, relationship, and social status increases the likelihood of voluntary denunciation. The design and reported results of elective fraud reporting fit this model.…”

“…As other research shows (Bergemann 2017), denunciations intended to harm social rivals occur across a variety of contexts. In the present context, fraud investigators’ structural position allows them to expose and mobilize acrimony, increasing the likelihood of significant negative effects.…”

“…Acrimonious social ties can produce costs when parties exploit informational access for personal gain. Bergemann (2017) examines self-interest as a driving factor in denunciations under repressive regimes. Denunciations can serve informants’ self-interest through two primary pathways: under coercion models, denunciations garner incentives or avoid disincentives; under volunteer models, denunciations lack direct (dis)incentives but provide other benefits.…”

“…Denunciations can serve informants’ self-interest through two primary pathways: under coercion models, denunciations garner incentives or avoid disincentives; under volunteer models, denunciations lack direct (dis)incentives but provide other benefits. Bergemann (2017:385) describes these indirect benefits in terms of “local negative networks”—that is, denunciation provides opportunities to harm or disadvantage proximate social rivals.…”

Getting Eyes in the Home: Child Protective Services Investigations and State Surveillance of Family Life

“…Organizations that take a holistic perspective on social problems and offer a range of responses become a useful resource for other frontline bureaucrats. In this context, rather than complaints (Herring 2019) or interpersonal conflicts (Bergemann 2017; Headworth 2019) driving referrals, merged therapeutic and punitive logics invite referrals from frontline bureaucrats with rehabilitative aspirations they feel they cannot fulfill. The possibility of coercive intervention, however, also generates widespread apprehension.…”