Denial-of-Service (dos) attacks on load frequency control in smart grids

Liu, Shichao; Liu, X. P.; Saddik, Abdulmotaleb El

doi:10.1109/isgt.2013.6497846

Cited by 150 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…This attack leads to causing communication link failure and excessive delays and consequently results in preventing the timely exchange of information between the sensors, actuators, and control systems [19]; • Switching attacks: an adversary causes physical disturbance in the power system by switching on and off one or more elements of the grid to cause instability within the power system. Effective switching attacks could be, for example, based on understanding the structure of the power system and accessing system state information [20]- [22].…”

Section: Control For Resilient Smart Gridsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As obvious from (19) the cyber-physical controller utilizes the centralized form for τ ≤ τ max . However, when the delay exceeds τ max , the controller switches to the decentralized mode.…”

Section: "Cyber-physical" Pfl Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here we try to find the latency characteristic function of the CPFL controller (i.e., the optimal values of α for the corresponding values of τ ). The results of this study will be used in building the cyber-physical PFL controller of (19). We consider both the New England and WECC test power systems.…”

Section: Unavailable Sensors Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result of (6), (19), and (22), the cyber-physical PFL controller is proposed for the New England test power system as…”

Section: A New England Power Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Cyber-Physical Control Framework for Transient Stability in Smart Grids

Farraj

Hammad

Kundur

2018

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

111

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Denial of service attacks and communication latency pose challenges for the operation of control systems within power systems. Specifically, excessive delay between sensors and controllers can substantially worsen the performance of distributed control schemes. In this article, we propose a framework for delay-resilient cyber-physical control of smart grid systems for transient stability applications. The proposed control scheme adapts its structure depending on the value of the latency. As an example, we consider a parametric feedback linearization (PFL) control paradigm and make it "cyber-aware." A delay-adaptive design that capitalizes on the features of PFL control is presented to enhance the time-delay tolerance of the power system. Depending on the information latency present in the smart grid, the parameters and the structure of the PFL controller are adapted accordingly to optimize performance. The improved resilience is demonstrated by applying the PFL controller to the New England 39-bus and WECC 9-bus test power systems following the occurrence of physical and cyber disturbances. Numerical results show that the proposed cyber-physical controller can tolerate substantial delays without noticeable performance degradation.

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Section: Control For Resilient Smart Gridsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: "Cyber-physical" Pfl Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Unavailable Sensors Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result of (6), (19), and (22), the cyber-physical PFL controller is proposed for the New England test power system as…”

Section: A New England Power Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Cyber-Physical Control Framework for Transient Stability in Smart Grids

Farraj

Hammad

Kundur

2018

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

111

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“…Some literature focuses on outsider attacks, such as cyber-physical attacks [17], load altering attacks [18] and distribution attacks [19], cyber security of substations [20], data attacks [21], false data injection attacks [22], data integrity attacks [23], traffic analysis attacks [24], man-in-the-middle attacks [25], DoS attacks [26], and etc. However, insider attacks in the SG network, such as attacks by the customer, attacks by the operators/maintenance personnel, and etc., have not been well investigated.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authentication and Authorization Scheme for Various User Roles and Devices in Smart Grid

Saxena

Choi

2016

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

123

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Abstract-The smart grid, as the next generation of the power grid, is characterized by employing many different types of intelligent devices, such as intelligent electronic devices located at substations, smart meters positioned in the home area network, and outdoor field equipment deployed in the fields. Also, there are various users in the smart grid network, including customers, operators, maintenance personnel, and etc., who use these devices for various purposes. Therefore, a secure and efficient mutual authentication and authorization scheme is needed in the smart grid to prevent various insider and outsider attacks on many different devices. In this paper, we propose an authentication and authorization scheme for mitigating outsider and insider threats in the smart grid by verifying the user authorization and performing the user authentication together whenever a user accesses the devices. The proposed scheme computes each user-role dynamically using an attribute-based access control and verifies the identity of user together with the device. Security and performance analysis show that the proposed scheme resists various insider as well as outsider attacks, and is more efficient in terms of communication and computation costs in comparison with the existing schemes. The correctness of the proposed scheme is also proved using BAN-Logic and Proverif.

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