Demoicracy, Transnational Partisanship and the EU

Abstract

Advocates of demoicracy dismiss the proposal to transform the EU into a supranational democracy on the grounds that there is no pan-European demos. This article examines several arguments that have been advanced to that effect and, noting some problems left outstanding, goes on to suggest that demoicrats who endorse the no-demos thesis fail to consider the possibility that citizens themselves may seek to europeanize the identities of Europeans. If we take this possibility seriously, it not only follows that the no-demos thesis is not a knockdown objection to supranational democracy. We are also provided with an alternative normative vision for transforming the EU into a legitimate supranational democratic order, one that turns upon the transformative potential of citizens who associate across borders in pursuit of shared political goals. The article concludes by examining this vision under the heading of 'transnational partisanship'.

Can partisans be pluralist? A comparative study of party member discourse in France and Hungary

“…These results also call for a reflection on the tensions that may exist between the different democratic functions of partisans, especially their responsibility to uphold norms of pluralism while providing citizens with reasons to engage with representative politics (on this second key function, see White, 2015a, 2015b; White and Ypi, 2010, 2011; Wolkenstein, 2018). The study suggests that French mainstream parties abide by norms of pluralist discourse; however, they have increasingly failed to fulfil their functions of intermediation between citizens and the state in past decades, to the point of obtaining together only a third of seats in the 2017–2022 French National Assembly.…”

“…What we need to establish, then, are the limits within which pluralist commitments should express themselves in a liberal democracy and, especially, the political actors from which we should expect these attitudes. In this regard, a number of political theorists have recently argued that specific responsibilities fall on partisans – those citizens that act with others in pursuit of translating a certain vision of the common good into governmental policy through competing in elections (Bonotti, 2011, 2018, 2019; Bonotti et al, 2018; Herman and Muirhead, 2020; Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein, 2017; Muirhead and Rosenblum, 2006; Stojanović and Bonotti, 2019; White, 2015a, 2015b; White and Ypi, 2010, 2011, 2016, 2018; Wolkenstein, 2016a, 2016b, 2018, 2019). The position of partisans in the public sphere – with privileged access to financial resources, media attention, law-making and key administrative positions – lends them significantly larger amounts of political power than other citizens (Herman and Muirhead, 2020).…”

“…In the past decade, a number of democratic theorists have aimed to rehabilitate partisanship as a normative category, and thus account for what ‘good partisanship’ entails in democratic societies (Bonotti, 2012, 2014, 2019; Bonotti et al, 2018; Herman, 2017; Herman and Muirhead, 2020; Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein, 2017; Muirhead, 2006, 2014; Muirhead and Rosenblum, 2006; Rosenblum, 2008; Stojanović and Bonotti, 2019; White, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; White and Ypi, 2010, 2011, 2018; Wolkenstein, 2016a, 2016b, 2018, 2019). Against the long-standing belief that partisanship, defined here as an array of discourses and practices in support of a certain vision of the common good attached to partisan identification (Herman, 2017), is necessarily vector of intolerance and division, one of the central contentions of this literature is that partisanship is compatible with a pluralist orientation.…”

Political Parties in Deeply Multilingual Polities: Institutional Conditions and Lessons for the EU

“…This could help Europarties to ensure that the views and demands of EU citizens are included in the articulation of their platforms, manifestoes, and proposals more than they currently are. Furthermore, transnational Europarties mobilizing from the bottom up (rather than via top‐down elite‐driven processes) could also contribute to the formation of a Europe‐wide demos that would be necessary for a supranational EU democracy to be more politically legitimate (Wolkenstein, ).…”

A Cosmopolitan Reading of Modern Monetary Theory

“…Notwithstanding all our understanding about the general preconditions of democracy, it remains controversial which kinds of institutional arrangements would best contribute to its realisation. Among a host of issues, the proper boundaries of the demos are hotly debated in both democratic theory and practice (Bellamy 2019, 41-47;Bohman 2007;Näsström 2011;Valentini 2014;Wolkenstein 2018). The lack of an uncontested way to determine who should have the right to participate in deciding on any given issue is reflected, for instance, in the persistent dispute about the appropriate "level" of decision-making.…”