Demographic Turbulence in the Arab World: Implications for Development Policy

Abstract

The Arab Spring's hallmarks of volatility and 'youthfulness' thwart sustained development, political cohesion and peace. Demographic 'youthfulness', due to recent high fertility, is accompanied by rapid growth. But the backstory is even bleaker. Cohort flows, producing large population waves, batter successive life-cycle stages, generating demands for services, markets, resources and capital. To overcome this, policies directed at youth (15-24) are pivotal; failure to integrate youth into the economy and society results in disadvantaged middle-aged parenting populations. This threatens longer-term, sustainable development and triggers political volatility. Yet, as is shown in this article, the international development community has failed to formulate appropriate strategies. Demographic Turbulence, Political Change and DevelopmentThe recent uprisings and other disturbances across the Arab countries have drawn attention to the importance of demographic factors in development as well as politics. During the 'Arab Spring' the media overwhelmingly stressed the youth of Arab countries. A heading in the The Guardian Weekly is typical of many at that time: 'To be Alive, Young and Arab' (Porter 2011). This paper aims to show that in terms of factors of population change, the Arab countries are notably turbulent by comparison both with the world as a whole and with non-Arab Muslim countries. Demographic turbulence is due to significant fluctuations in birth cohort sizes.This article argues that demographic turbulence is a key determinant of systemic underdevelopment and political instability. The term 'demographic turbulence' is used in the sense employed in specialist analyses of population changes that are rapid and that have impacts on societal structures and dynamics. They include: age-compositional changes, particularly when accompanied by fluctuations in birth cohort sizes; large, sudden migratory flows; shifts in family structures; and radical trends in fertility or mortality (Pool 2005(Pool , 2006a(Pool , 2006b. Most social and demographic behaviours are age-specific, and this translates across to economic factors: patterns of production, consumption, supply and demand. Even the fiscal sectors have age-specific drivers, influencing which dependants need tax-based transfers and who pays taxes.The focus of the article is age-structural changes that successively produce youth-age bulges, proportionately by comparison with other age groups, and then generate deficits as cohort sizes decrease. Patterns of bulges followed by deficits are then seen at

Demographic transition in Sultanate of Oman: emerging demographic dividend and challenges

“…After emergence of demographic dividend, if a county cannot transform the expanding working age population into human capital and utilize that capital properly, the emerging demographic dividend can become a demographic burden for the country that may lead to socio-economic and political unrest [14,15]. Some demographers implicitly ascribed the recent demographic transition with rising "youth bulges" in the Arab world as a major cause of recent "Arab Spring" that have drawn attention to the importance of demographic factors in development as well as politics [16,17].…”

Demographic transition and the emerging windows of opportunities and challenges in Bangladesh

“…If the prevailing social and economic conditions of a county are not conducive to economic development, and the country cannot transform the expanding working age population into human capital and utilize this capital properly, the increasing working age population can become a burden for the country that may lead to political and social unrest (Urdal 2004;Gomez and Lamb 2013). Some analysts have ascribed the rising 'youth bulges' in the Arab world as a major cause of the recent 'Arab Spring' and have drawn attention to the importance of demographic factors in development as well as politics (Pool 2012).…”