Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-Chilean Relations

Abstract

This article explores how Argentina and Chile put aside a century‐long rivalry to form a dynamic regional partnership in the years after 1984. Their experience suggests that interstate behavior is more complex than many theories admit. Cooperation increased during and after the Cold War, with severe and moderate debt burdens, between economic liberalizers and statists, and under authoritarian and democratic regimes. This study uses institutional analysis to argue that executives were the indispensable actors who combined institutionally focused incentives and the ability to forge cooperative agreements. Previous attempts between Argentina and Chile, as well as elsewhere on the continent, failed when weak executives in one or both countries could not sustain cooperation over domestic opposition. Two crucial points are Alfonsín's and Pinochet̂s foundation‐building agreements in 1984–85 and Menem's and Aylwin's deepening institutionalization of the relationship in 1990–91.

Explaining the Maintenance Process of International Rivalries

“…Given such strong conflict-prone natures of military regime, hard-line veto players are more likely to be empowered in rivals ruled by military regime. They, in particular, are likely to align themselves with the military leaders for complicating the negotiation process through the initiation of military conflicts against foreign rivals, thereby increasing the possibility of a persisting rivalry (Parish Jr. 2006).…”

Friendship and Politics

“…Notably, one of the connections between friendship and politics that has persisted over the centuries has been in the alliances between states and nations where the terminology of 'friendship' has been applied to the various treaties and contracts on peace, trade, military assistance and colonisation. The history of this is both long and diverse: for example, the Greeks and Romans used treaties of philia or amicitia; oral friendship treaties exist between pre-European Samoa and Tonga; the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 proclaimed 'sincere Amity' between signatories; the 1850s saw Anglo-Japanese friendship treaties; a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed in the 1950s; prior to the 1980s the United States pursued friendship treaties with Pacific island nations (such as the Republic of Kiribati in 1979); in 1984 the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded between Argentina and Chile; and the ASEAN Treaty of South-East Asian nations of 2005 was a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (compare Bederman, 2001;Devere et al, 2007;Parish, 2006;Roshchin, 2006).…”

Christopher Darnton, Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Figures, tables, notes, index, 285 pp.; paperback $40.46, Kindle $35.96.

“…As Darnton recognizes, "The most compelling explanation of Argentine-Chilean rapprochement in 1983-1984 involves military acquiescence to presidential cooperation initiatives" (165, emphasis added). Alfonsín's leadership was key in this regard (Parish 2006). And despite the serious economic contraction of the early 1980s, an alternative mission on the part of the armed forces, given the emergence of a foe common to both Argentina and Chile, was not necessary to drive rapprochement.…”