Abstract:Jillian Schwedler examines three questions about the political inclusion of Islamist groups in the Middle East. Using empirical evidence from studies of elections in the region, she discusses whether inclusion or exclusion is a better strategy for deflating radical challenges. She concludes that inclusion is far more likely to produce an overall moderate political sphere, though it is unlikely to eliminate all forms of radicalism. Development (2007) 50, 56–61. doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100324
“…Within the disciplines of Middle East politics and terrorism studies, the debate on moderation has largely centred on Islamist entities due to their habitual ex- Ashour (2009Ashour ( , 2011, Bayat (2007), Browers (2009), Clark (2006), Norton (1995, Schwedler (2007Schwedler ( , 2011Schwedler ( , 2013 and Wickham (2004Wickham ( , 2013 have all provided important insights into the workings of and systemic effects upon Islamist parties by way of their inclusion/exclusion from formal politics, i.e., contributing to what has been termed the "inclusion-moderation hypothesis". The inclusion-moderation hypothesis fundamentally seeks to explain the behaviour, ideology and strategies of Islamist movements and parties, the basic assumption being that the integration of such radical/anti-establishment parties into formal (pluralist, but not necessarily democratic) politics will lead to change in the form of moderation of these actors.…”
Section: From Post-rebel Parties To Islamist Inclusion and Moderationmentioning
This article analyzes factors relating to moderation and immoderation of post-rebel parties in power, thus making a significant departure from previous studies, which have tended to examine these from a position of political weakness. The rigorous analysis marries approaches and findings from comparative politics and Middle East studies with a view to making an original, qualitative contribution to the academic debate on the inclusion of Islamist parties in formal politics based on lessons learned from the experiences of 12 post-rebel parties across the globe, thus also breaking with the trend for single-country case studies or larger, quantitative studies. The research finds that whether post-rebel parties in power are likely to behave moderately largely depends upon the political environment at the time of the conflict's end, i.e., when these parties first gain entry into the formal political system. Post-rebel parties entering a political system with a tradition of resolving political disagreements within the electoral arena, in which the post-rebel party faces rivalry from sizeable competitors, and where the main issue driving the post-rebel party's support during the conflict is no longer salient, are more likely to behave inclusively and remain moderate once in power. With reference to Islamist parties, the issue thus becomes a question of how to best create an environment that facilitates Islamist moderation upon these parties' inclusion into formal politics, rather than a debate over whether the inclusion or exclusion of such parties will lead to their moderation. This finding is likely to significantly change how scholars approach Islamist parties and their inclusion into formal politics.
“…Within the disciplines of Middle East politics and terrorism studies, the debate on moderation has largely centred on Islamist entities due to their habitual ex- Ashour (2009Ashour ( , 2011, Bayat (2007), Browers (2009), Clark (2006), Norton (1995, Schwedler (2007Schwedler ( , 2011Schwedler ( , 2013 and Wickham (2004Wickham ( , 2013 have all provided important insights into the workings of and systemic effects upon Islamist parties by way of their inclusion/exclusion from formal politics, i.e., contributing to what has been termed the "inclusion-moderation hypothesis". The inclusion-moderation hypothesis fundamentally seeks to explain the behaviour, ideology and strategies of Islamist movements and parties, the basic assumption being that the integration of such radical/anti-establishment parties into formal (pluralist, but not necessarily democratic) politics will lead to change in the form of moderation of these actors.…”
Section: From Post-rebel Parties To Islamist Inclusion and Moderationmentioning
This article analyzes factors relating to moderation and immoderation of post-rebel parties in power, thus making a significant departure from previous studies, which have tended to examine these from a position of political weakness. The rigorous analysis marries approaches and findings from comparative politics and Middle East studies with a view to making an original, qualitative contribution to the academic debate on the inclusion of Islamist parties in formal politics based on lessons learned from the experiences of 12 post-rebel parties across the globe, thus also breaking with the trend for single-country case studies or larger, quantitative studies. The research finds that whether post-rebel parties in power are likely to behave moderately largely depends upon the political environment at the time of the conflict's end, i.e., when these parties first gain entry into the formal political system. Post-rebel parties entering a political system with a tradition of resolving political disagreements within the electoral arena, in which the post-rebel party faces rivalry from sizeable competitors, and where the main issue driving the post-rebel party's support during the conflict is no longer salient, are more likely to behave inclusively and remain moderate once in power. With reference to Islamist parties, the issue thus becomes a question of how to best create an environment that facilitates Islamist moderation upon these parties' inclusion into formal politics, rather than a debate over whether the inclusion or exclusion of such parties will lead to their moderation. This finding is likely to significantly change how scholars approach Islamist parties and their inclusion into formal politics.
“…In studies on the Arab world, inclusion most often means formal participation in the political arena, especially in liberalised autocracies (Brumberg 2002). In this sense, political parties, especially Islamist parties, have been a focus of past studies (see for instance Lust-Okar 2005, Schwedler 2007, Wegner 2011. However, as the Arab uprisings were characterised by mass protests outside formal institutions, such a concept doesn't exactly fit the phenomenon under investigation.…”
Section: Conceptual Considerations: a Target-oriented Approachmentioning
“…2 As a leading scholar writes, Islamist moderation has emerged as 'the issue at stake in debates on Islamist political participation'. 3 This literature focuses on whether the inclusion of Islamist organizations in the formal political processes leads to their ideological moderation. Moderation is typically defined narrowly as 'becoming truly committed to democratic practices'.…”
This article studies a novel factor relevant for the moderation of an Islamist party: the degree of dependency on a social movement organization. This question is examined in a case study analysing the evolution of the relationship between the Moroccan Islamist party, Party of Justice and Development (PJD), and its founding social movement organization. Over time, the PJD has been gaining autonomy, becoming more moderate and simultaneously gaining strength. Contemporaneously, liberalization in Morocco has been partially reversed, partly as a result of the rising Islamist strength. These findings suggest that it is the strength of the Islamist opposition, rather than its ideological rigidity, that makes MENA rulers reluctant to liberalize. We study the implications of these findings for European Union policy towards Islamist parties in the MENA region.
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