Democratization and International Organizations

Abstract

International organizations~IOs! have become increasingly pervasive features of the global landscape+ While the implications of this development have been studied extensively, relatively little research has examined the factors that prompt states to enter IOs+ We argue that democratization is an especially potent impetus to IO membership+ Democratizing countries are likely to enter IOs because leaders have difficulty credibly committing to sustain liberal reforms and the consolidation of democracy+ Chief executives often have an incentive to solidify their position during democratic transitions by rolling back political liberalization+ Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms, especially if the organization is composed primarily of democratic members+ Tests of this hypothesis, based on a new data set of IOs covering the period from 1965 to 2000, confirm that democratization spurs states to join IOs+ In recent years, international organizations~IOs! have become increasingly pervasive features of the global landscape+ Both the number of such organizations and the range of issue-areas they cover have grown rapidly+ The implications of this development have been studied extensively and hotly debated in the field of international relations+ Whereas some researchers believe that IOs have little effect on state behavior, many observers argue that the proliferation of these institutions will facilitate interstate cooperation and help to resolve the interstate conflicts that do arise+ 1 In contrast, relatively little research has been conducted on the factors that prompt states to enter IOs+ This gap in the literature is both surprising and important+ While many countries have rushed to join IOs, others participate in few of these organizations+ What determines the propensity of states to join IOs?

International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders Promote Economic Reform?

“…However, the empirical evidence on the role of international institutions in a leader's political calculus remains scant. Although scholars recognize the domestic benefits of joining international institutions (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006;Vreeland 2003), existing work has not investigated why individual leaders join international institutions at specific times.…”

“…First, international institutions allow credible policy commitments (Büthe and Milner 2008;Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). If a leader joins an international institution that increases the cost of reneging on liberalization, the extent of reform increases.…”

“…By contrast, new leaders have yet to consolidate their rule, so their credibility is limited. Lack of credibility is harmful because economic reforms cannot reassure investors unless the government is able to credibly commit to them in the long run (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006).…”

Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy

“…Among democracies, those who face threats to their democratic regimes are especially prone to form FTAs. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) also distinguish between different types of democracies and their willingness to join international organizations. They find that countries that have undergone recent transitions to democracy are more likely to join international organizations.…”

Changing state structures: Outside in

“…International organizations create lock in by providing information, increasing the cost of violating property rights, credibly threatening sanctions against military coups, and creating a reputational cost for withdrawal. Mansfield and Pevehouse (12) find that democratizing states are more likely to join international organizations, especially those states whose members are democratic, than other states (11,12).…”