Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador

Abstract

After long neglecting issues of citizen security and justice, democratisation theorists have recently begun to recognise the importance of the rule of law. Yet theorising the construction of state institutions of security and justice has tended to be piecemeal and divorced from broader theoretical debates. Using the case of post-war El Salvador, this article first argues that justice and security are tremendously important for the survivability and everyday relevance of democracy, given that crime is the chief threat to support for democracy.Second, the article explores competing views of institutional reform. It finds support for path-dependent ‘mode-of-transition’ approaches that postulate heightened agency to adopt new rules and reform institutions during uncertain transition periods. However, more sceptical cultural and institutional theorists are right insofar as the formal removal of authoritarian structures and personnel is easier than the informal transformation of state practices and of society's attitudes about state services. The article also finds that security (i.e., military, intelligence and police) reforms operate differently to judicial reforms, which were more difficult and were less tied to the country's peace process. The interaction of these reform processes with a post-war crime wave helps explain why international observers consider El Salvador's reforms a success story, but many Salvadoreans do not.

Mano Dura: El Salvador responds to gangs

“…Before the introduction of the legislation, this figure had not surpassed one per cent (interview with Miguel Cruz, September 2004). Instead, key problems facing society had been identified as the broader problems of crime and ongoing poverty and economics (Call 2003). In no way would I discount the threatening behaviour exhibited by gangs, nor do I wish to understate citizens' fear.…”

La Mano Dura and the Violence of Civil Society in Bolivia

“…While it is unlikely that security issues will lead directly to a military coup or some other totalitarian seizure of power, what this discussion suggests is that as people become more familiar with and accepting of violence and human rights violations as means to combat crime, the quality of democracy becomes further eroded, setting the stage for a further weakening of democratic protections, values, and rule of law (Call 2003;Pérez 2003). As a result, despite the optimism of some (such as Hakim, cited earlier), 'the authoritarian option' may indeed be 'thinkable' once more in Latin America.…”

“…Even in the absence of direct experience of crime, the fear of criminal violence, perpetuated by 'talk of crime', may drive people to violence and extra-legal measures in pursuit of security (Caldeira 2000;Dammert and Malone 2003;Elbert 1998;Rotker 2002). Where fear of crime is very high, tolerance of more heavyhanded, mano dura authoritarian measures to control it is also high (Call 2003;Duce and Pérez Perdomo 2003: 82). In various Latin American cities, people express a willingness to allow police to conduct illegal searches and detention of suspects, and support for the death penalty, formally illegal in most Latin American constitutions, is strongly on the rise (Lagos 2000;Smulovitz 2003).…”

Just How Liberal Is the Liberal Peace?

“…73 Peace accords often provide for reform of the judicial system. In a number of cases truth commissions have made recommendations for judicial reform 74 and for improvements in human rights. Peace accords also regularly involve constitutional changes to clarify, reinforce or reform the rule of law, and have included the establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g.…”