Democratic Transition, Persistent Civilian Control over the Military, and the South Korean Anomaly

Abstract

South Korea's civilian control over the military has been amazingly stable, and no signs of political moves by the military have ever been detected since 1993. Given the frequency of military's intervention in civil politics and a relatively long duration of military rule, such civil-military relations seem quite anomalous. The article argues that the persistent civilian control over the military was an outcome of path-dependency of the military rule that disfavours military intervention in civil politics, while strengthening civilian control over the military. In South Korea, the military did not intervene in civilian politics as an institution. Two military interventions (1961 and 1979) were nothing but greedy acts of politically motivated military officers, and those who seized political power crafted institutional arrangements that could prevent another military intervention. Consequently, the military in South Korea was highly de-politicized, and path dependency has produced a structure rather favourable to civilian control over the military in the postdemocratic transition period. Sanctioning and monitoring deserve special attention in this regard. Finally, socio-economic development and overall democratic maturity have led to the popular rejection of the military as a political actor, fostering the norm of traditional professionalism within the military.

The democratic deficit in South Korea: the democratic control of armed forces since 1993

“…The system is not democratic if the unelected military makes and implements security or defense policies, one of the nation's major policy areas. Studies on democratic control and within Korean studies research have paid attention to this issue (Croissant, 2004;Croissant and Kuehn, 2009;Croissant et al, 2011;Moon and Rhyu, 2011;Croissant et al, 2013;Kuehn, 2017). This study adds to the existing Fourth, how personnel affairs are conducted in the military should be examined, along with whether the roles and duties of the military can be strictly limited to the military domain (Trinkunas, 2002;Born, 2006: 159-160;Bruneau and Goetze, 2006;Giraldo, 2006;Rukavishnikov and Pugh, 2006: 136-137;Young, 2006;Croissant et al, 2013: 33).…”

“…It reveals the aspects of the military forces that have and that have not been controlled by the democratically elected government and explains why the overpowered military has not faded even after the eradication of Hanahoe and the consolidation of democracy in South Korea in its aftermath. Due to the prevailing perception that control over the military is pivotal in a democracy, as well as South Korea's unique history including the Korean War and the long military dictatorship that followed, a plethora of research has been conducted on democratic control of the South Korean military (Lee, 1994(Lee, , 2011Yang, 1998;Jun, 2001;Croissant, 2004;Saxer, 2004;Bechtol, 2005;Kim et al, 2006;Chung, 2008;Croissant and Kuehn, 2009;Moon and Rhyu, 2011;Kim, 2012Kim, , 2014Croissant et al, 2013;Kuehn, 2017).…”

Unbuilding from the Inside: Leadership and Democratization in South Africa and South Korea

“…In South Korea, the military dominated politics for much of the period following the formation of the Republic after the Second World War. While the military was nominally in charge, it has been argued that the rise to dominance of an internal faction (Hanahoe) led by Chun challenged the institutional mission and weakened professionalism (Kim 2013;Moon and Rhyu 2011). The result was that when Roh Tae Woo came to power, there was a desire within the military as an institution to leave politics (Cotton 1989).…”

“…However, his position was essential as he 'represented an important symbol of continuity that bridged the transition from the old regime to the young democracy' (Croissant 2004: 371; see also Moon and Rhyu 2011). This stability and continuity were significant as the 'generals and coup-makers were often waiting in the wings' (Bedeski 1994: 6).…”

“…The divided nature of the opposition meant that Roh was able to secure victory in these elections and a five-year term in office (Bedeski 1994). While Roh had been successful, his ties to the preceding Chun regime limited his longer-term appeal in the eyes of the population (Moon and Rhyu 2011).…”