Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability

Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2567326

Cited by 11 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Table A. 4 shows the difference between the effect of any length of ex-clusion on withdrawal after reintegration compared to one-period exclusion in Exo1P. Reintegrated subjects withdraw significantly less (at the 5% level) after three periods of exclusion in Exo3P than after one in Exo1P, controlling for the average withdrawal in the group in the period preceding immediately reintegration, which supports Hypothesis 3.…”

Section: Exo1psupporting

confidence: 56%

“…For example, studies on the length of prison sentences find little evidence that length affects either recidivism Blumstein et al, 1978), employment or income (Needels, 1996; after rehabilitation. 4 Moreover, we are not aware of any study measuring the impact of the length of informal exclusion on deterrence and compliance. The absence of conclusive evidence is partly due to the fact that the empirical analysis based on natural data is often plagued with endogeneity and selection issues.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In our study punishment results from a group decision, which may signal more strongly what the norm of the group is, especially when subjects choose also the length of exclusion. Ambrus and Greiner (2015) have shown that democratic punishment decreases anti-social behavior compared to individual punishment. In our case, we can compare retaliation behavior for a given length of exclusion according to the mode of choice of this length.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Soldà

Villeval

2017

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long vs. short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. Keywords:Ostracism, exclusion, reintegration, cooperation, experiment JEL codes:C92, H41, D23 Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social DilemmaAlice Solda and Marie Claire Villeval April 24, 2018 AbstractUsing a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long vs. short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. JEL-Code: C92, H41, D23

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Section: Exo1psupporting

confidence: 56%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Soldà

Villeval

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…Importantly, however, this approach increased cooperation levels compared with a peer punishment system. Ambrus and Greiner () extended these findings: in their study, individuals could vote directly for or against punishment of another individual. If at least three of four group members voted for punishment of a fifth group member, punishment was executed.…”

Section: Democratic Peer Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…The strength of punishment, however, was set a priori by the experimenter. Ambrus and Greiner () observed higher cooperation levels and a higher net payoff of democratic punishment compared with peer punishment.…”

Section: Democratic Peer Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Advantage of Democratic Peer Punishment in Sustaining Cooperation within Groups

Pfattheicher

Böhm

Kesberg

2018

Behavioral Decision Making

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In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behavior while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behavior and to increase cooperation is to establish a system of costly peer punishment, that is, the possibility for every individual involved in the dilemma to impose costly punishment on interaction partners. However, recent research revealed that, in contrast to a situation without punishment, peer punishment is inefficient and maladaptive in the sense that the total payoff is reduced and punishment of cooperative individuals (i.e., antisocial punishment) is possible. In the present work, we propose that a system of democratic peer punishment, that is, direct and equal participation of each individual in the punishment decision-making process with punishment only executed when a majority has voted for its execution, can address the shortcomings of a peer punishment system. Using iterated public goods games, we show higher cooperation levels, higher total payoffs, and reduced executed punishment in the democratic compared with a peer punishment system. Moreover, we document that fairness perceptions, satisfaction, and interpersonal trust are increased in the democratic punishment system. Implications for how cooperation and democratic punishment systems may evolve are discussed. democratic decisions about punishments, whereas in democratic decisions about positions (e.g., elections), the individual participation of potential holders of the respective position is more common.Cooperation and Democratic Peer Punishment 565 S. Pfattheicher et al.

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Judicial error and cooperation

Markussen

Putterman

Tyran

2016

European Economic Review

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Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. By use of an incentive-compatible mechanism, we find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. We find that the strength of this preference is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.

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Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability

Cited by 11 publications

References 36 publications

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

The Advantage of Democratic Peer Punishment in Sustaining Cooperation within Groups

Judicial error and cooperation

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