Democratic epistemology and democratic morality: the appeal and challenges of Peircean pragmatism

Abstract

Democratic epistemology and democratic morality:the appeal and challenges of Peircean pragmatism. Abstract:Does the wide distribution of political power in democracies, relative to other modes of government, result in better decisions? Specifically, do we have any reason to believe that they are better qualitatively -more reasoned, better supported by the available evidence, more deserving of support -than those which have been made by other means? In order to answer this question we examine the recent effort by Talisse and Misak to show that democracy is epistemically justified. Highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments, we conclude that the differences between an epistemic conception of democracy and an epistemic justification of democracy are fundamental to determining the relative attractions of different arguments for democracy, and their implications for actual forms of government. (120 words)

Spotlight: Pragmatism in contemporary political theory

“…The idea that we can only make sense of the idea of our having a true belief, or being an authentic believer, if we commit ourselves to democratic values, provides an ingenious but questionable path out from the dilemmas confronted by the experimentalist argument and is the subject of copious scrutiny (e.g. Bacon, 2010;Erman and Möller, 2019;Festenstein, 2004Festenstein, 2007Festenstein, , 2017Lever and Chin, 2019;MacGilvray, 2014;Rydenfelt, 2019). Where the account is most persuasive is in its attempt to provide microfoundations for an experimentalist argument that sometimes tends to handwaving.…”