Democracy, Federalism, and the Size of States

Hiscox, Michael; Lake, David A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1002686

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Several writers employ concepts drawn from federalism to shed light on supranational regimes, in particular, the European Union (e.g., Inman and Rubinfeld 1992;Sbragia 1993;Scharpf 1988). Interjurisdictional competition informs Alessandra Casella's work on clubs (Casella and Frey 1992), Barry Weingast's (1995) market-preserving federalism, Bruno Frey's FOCJ (functional, overlapping, competitive jurisdictions) (Frey and Eichenberger 1999), and recent analyses of the number and size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore 1997;Hiscox and Lake 2002). Finally, deductive theorists analyze multi-level governance in terms of supply and demand for jurisdictions.…”

Section: Islands Of Theorizingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They challenge the efficiency of monopolistic, territorially fixed, and nested governments and propose instead flexible jurisdictions conceived as "voluntary coalitions for financing, choosing, and enjoying excludable public goods" (Casella and Weingast 1995, 15). Interjurisdictional competition informs Alessandra Casella's work on clubs (Casella and Frey 1992), Barry Weingast's (1995) market-preserving federalism, Bruno Frey's FOCJ (functional, overlapping, competitive jurisdictions) (Frey and Eichenberger 1999), and recent analyses of the number and size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore 1997;Hiscox and Lake 2002). The study of local government in the United States and Western Europe bears directly on multi-level, polycentric governance.…”

Section: Islands Of Theorizingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

Hooghe¹,

Marks²

2003

Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.

523

151

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T he reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance.

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Section: Islands Of Theorizingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Islands Of Theorizingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

Hooghe¹,

Marks²

2003

Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.

523

151

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Bringing the benefits of David to Goliath: special economic zones and institutional improvement

Hartwell

2017

Regional Studies

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The theory behind special economic zones (SEZs) focuses on their role in overcoming broader policy failings in a country. This paper hypothesizes that the ability of smaller countries to reform more quickly provides a theoretical 'missing link' as to how SEZs can assist reform, developing the idea of SEZs as a 'small country in a large country.' Using a new database, the paper tests this proposition, examining if SEZs have actually been able to spur on institutional improvement in large countries. Results show that SEZs do influence the institutional development of a country, contingent upon prevailing institutional trends.

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The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital

Baum

Lake

2003

American J Political Sci

Self Cite

313

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Democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy. We argue that there are significant indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education. Where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital, we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators. In addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth, we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies. We conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30-year panel of 128 countries. We find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth. Rather, we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in nonpoor countries.

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Democracy, Federalism, and the Size of States

Cited by 5 publications

References 23 publications

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

Bringing the benefits of David to Goliath: special economic zones and institutional improvement

The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital

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