Democracy and Transparency

Hollyer, James R.; Rosendorff, B. Peter; Vreeland, James Raymond

doi:10.1017/s0022381611000880

Cited by 337 publications

(195 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…As outlined above, we do not estimate fixed effects models due to the lack of variation in our variables of interest over time. 34 As can be seen, the results are in line with those shown above. In particular, please note that they do not depend on using telephone lines as a proxy for information transmission.…”

Section: Insert Figure 3 Heresupporting

confidence: 90%

“…The table employs both proxies for the importance of private information: information transmission and information transpareny, and the five different definitions of federal vs. unitary states. The fact that 34 Additional tables with the full specifications of all models are available on request. the indicators stem from different authors and sources should minimize sensitivity towards the choice of a certain specification.…”

Section: Who Is the Principal And Who Is The Agent?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence

et al. 2013

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This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of governments in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. We analyze two alternative policy-decision schemes-'decentralization' and 'centralization'-within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework. The quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the government levels and on which government level controls the degree of decentralization. We show that the extent of misaligned interests and the relative importance of local and central government knowledge affect the optimal choice of policydecision schemes. Our empirical analysis shows that countries' choices depend on the relative importance of their private information. Importantly, the results differ significantly between unitary and federal countries, in line with our theory.

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Section: Insert Figure 3 Heresupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Who Is the Principal And Who Is The Agent?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence

et al. 2013

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“…16 Gandhi 2008;Geddes 1999. 17 Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2011. officials being judged by GDP maintain some power over the bureaucrats who create the local GDP estimates. While national-level officials are far away, local officials may take advantage of their position to adjust the numbers in their favor.…”

Section: Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China

Wallace¹

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

232

104

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Economic statistics inform citizens of general conditions, while central leaders use them to evaluate local officials. Are economic data systematically manipulated? After establishing discrepancies in economic data series cross-nationally, this article examines Chinese sub-national growth data. It leverages variation in the likelihood of manipulation over two dimensions, arguing that politically sensitive data are more likely to be manipulated at politically sensitive times. Gross domestic product (GDP) releases generate headlines, while highly correlated electricity production and consumption data are relatively unnoticed. In Chinese provinces, the difference between GDP and electricity growth increases in years with leadership turnover, which is consistent with juking the stats for political reasons. The analysis points to the political role of information and the limits of nonelectoral accountability mechanisms in authoritarian regimes.

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“…Transparency is broadly recognized as an essential component of sustainable development and good governance [1,2,3], especially with regard to the management of natural resources [4]. In order to develop a more secure investment environment and provide the public with knowledge of natural resource rents received by their governments, terrestrially-based standards such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have been established to ensure greater fiscal transparency [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the basic elements of transparency of regional fisheries management organizations

2015

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This paper reports on the first global study of regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) transparency. It was prompted by recent scholarship that suggests that RFMOs are failing to meet their conservation and management mandates and that transparency is a critical element of this performance. In this study, 11 RFMOs were evaluated using 34 questions, divided into three sections: i) access to full, up-to-date and accurate information; ii) public participation in decision-making; and iii) access to outcomes. Secretariats for all 11 RFMOs were contacted, and all responded, to correct and comment on initial findings and to share additional information. The total scores in this study reflect transparency as measured against current good practices in RFMOs as a whole, rather than some sort of idealistic benchmark. Each question should therefore be seen as a diagnostic tool that shows where some RFMO(s) fall short and how they can correct the shortfall based on the practices of their peers. These results have highlighted a number of good practices amongst RFMOs, with no single RFMO standing out as having particularly poor transparency practices. On the other hand, there also were not any RFMOs that had exemplary transparency practices in every respect and all RFMOs still have room to improve upon their basic transparency practices. This first transparency assessment is necessarily broad in nature and considers only very basic elements of transparency. It is to be expected that as RFMO practices become more sophisticated, so will the techniques and criteria of future transparency assessments.

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Democracy and Transparency

Cited by 337 publications

References 30 publications

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence

Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China

Evaluating the basic elements of transparency of regional fisheries management organizations

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