Democracy and Epistemic Fairness: Testimonial Justice as a Founding Principle of Aggregative Democracy

Abstract

The current discussion on the relationship of epistemic justice to democracy focuses on its relationship to deliberative democracy. This article concerns the relationship of epistemic justice—specifically, testimonial justice which I call “epistemic fairness”—to aggregative democracy or democracy by voting. The aim of this article is to establish that in a good theory of democracy, epistemic fairness is one of the founding principles of the democratic institution of voting, that is, the principles by which the democratic institution of voting is organized. Under an arguably plausible interpretation, the democratic institution of voting turns out to be committed to realizing epistemic fairness. If a theory of democracy implies that epistemic fairness is a founding principle of the democratic institution of voting, a number of implications follow with respect to the issues related to the practice of voting in actual democracies, such as the problem of gerrymandering or the fairness of the aggregation rule.

The Epistemic Aims of Democracy

“…Universal enfranchisement allows all citizens to have an equal say in what political policies and candidates are chosen, preventing the crowding out of certain opinions due to bias or prejudice. Kim (2022, p. 173) holds that “epistemic fairness is one of the founding principles of the democratic institution of voting,” while Anderson (2012, p. 172) simply defines democracy as “universal participation on terms of equality of all inquirers.” Medina (2012, p. 4) takes striving for democracy to be the same as fighting against epistemic injustice, saying that part of the “ongoing struggle toward democracy is the resistance against epistemic injustices.” Universal suffrage also creates a mechanism for overcoming hermeneutical injustice, as laws and politicians that are able to speak to the disenfranchised can give voice to the experiences of the oppressed.…”

Epistemic Fairness in Militant Democracies: Shaping Freedom of Speech on the Internet in the Inner Six

“…The article aims to verify the theory-grounded assumption that epistemic fairness in legally defining threats to liberal democracy is a component of militant democracies that makes democracy last and not erode (Kim, 2022)� A threat's definition is epistemically fair when it draws on an actual diagnosis of the threat, including its consequences for a political nation's sovereignty� Introducing the category of epistemic fairness to militant democracy studies is a theoretical contribution to expanding the theory of contemporary militant democracies� It enriches our understanding of defining threats to democracies called enemies of democracy and their consequences for political regimes� Moreover, the study provides initial empirical evidence to support a theory-based explanation of the relationship between the epistemic fairness of threats' definitions and de-democratization� Still, it has limited exploratory and explanatory power due to its limited focus on only one anti-democratic restriction�…”