Demand information sharing of fresh produce supply chain considering competing suppliers’ freshness‐keeping effort

Abstract

This paper considers a fresh produce supply chain in which a retailer sources alternative produce from two competing suppliers. The suppliers make efforts to preserve product freshness, while the retailer, with demand forecast information, can share it with none, one or both of the suppliers strategically. By constructing a multistage game model, the optimal demand information sharing strategy in the supply chain is explored. The results show that the retailer has the willingness to disclose demand information only when the freshness elasticity is high. Significantly, with the improvement of the freshness elasticity, the retailer will transform from sharing information with both suppliers to one supplier. The suppliers are always willing to accept the information disclosed by the retailer. However, complete transparency of demand information may hurt the supply chain under certain conditions. To improve the supply chain performance, the retailer can charge both suppliers for information fees and adjust from sharing information with no suppliers to both suppliers with a relatively low freshness elasticity. Conversely, the retailer can change from sharing information with both suppliers to sharing information with one supplier through a charging contract with a relatively high freshness elasticity.

Retailers' information disclosure strategies with behavior‐based pricing in competitive supply chains

“…First, some researchers classify information disclosure based on market demand and product quality (He et al, 2018; Zhang et al, 2019). Retailers can share market demand information with manufacturers or suppliers (Chen et al, 2022; Mishra et al, 2009; Shang et al, 2015; Zhang & Zhang, 2020). The manufacturers have advantages in acquiring product quality information and share the information with retailers and consumers (Feng et al, 2019; Ghosh & Galbreth, 2013; Hong et al, 2021; Huang & Yang, 2016; Scheele et al, 2017; Wang et al, 2022; Xu et al, 2021).…”

Information sharing in an e‐tailing supply chain for fresh produce with supplier encroachment

“…This paper attaches importance to the retailer sharing information with consumers, instead of the upstream supplier. Besides, Liu et al (2021b) and Chen et al (2024) discuss the matter of information sharing in the FSC, but they both just aim at a single information sharing strategy. Differently, our paper introduces the supplier's choice in encroaching under information asymmetry and investigates the e-retailer's (supplier's) information sharing (encroachment) strategy.…”

“…For example, Liu et al (2021b) study the information sharing strategy in an E-FSC and indicate that the e-retailer wants to share information initiatively. Chen et al (2024) examine the information sharing strategy in an FSC based on the suppliers' competition, and they indicate the retailer may want to share information with one of the suppliers. Both these studies just consider a single strategy of information sharing in the FSC.…”

“…Chen et al. (2024) examine the information sharing strategy in an FSC based on the suppliers’ competition, and they indicate the retailer may want to share information with one of the suppliers. Both these studies just consider a single strategy of information sharing in the FSC.…”

Analyzing the Effects of Government Subsidies on Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chains with the Implementation of Blockchain Traceability Technology

“…Liu and colleagues have explored the information sharing strategy in the fresh agricultural retail supply chain, discovering that information sharing can benefit electronic retailers, who often choose to share information voluntarily [12]. Chen and their team have researched demand information sharing between retailers and two competitors [13].…”