Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving

Bortolotti, Lisa; Broome, Matthew A.

doi:10.1080/09515080802516212

Cited by 27 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…People have attempted to flesh out this phenomenon by utilizing distinctions between primary and secondary delusions (Jaspers 1963), pathological beliefs and pathologies of belief (Aimola Davies and Davies 2009), or delusions that are authored and delusions that are not (Bortolotti and Broome 2008). Primary delusions, pathological beliefs, and unauthored delusions share some interesting features, even if these terminologies are by no means equivalent.…”

Section: Do Theories Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…It is also true that bedrock beliefs do not usually require justification, but this does not mean that they cannot receive justification or that they are not endorsed for reasons (Bortolotti and Broome 2008). The thought that basic beliefs are not amenable to justification derives from a narrow conception of acceptable forms of justification, according to which beliefs can be justified only on the basis of other beliefs that are necessarily more basic.…”

Section: Justifying and Revising Bedrock Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…But charges of irrationality cannot shed light on what is distinctive about delusions, because violations of norms of rationality in delusional beliefs are not different in kind from those we find in ordinary beliefs (Bortolotti 2002;Bortolotti and Broome 2008). As Rhodes and Gipps maintain, we need to look elsewhere for an explanation of why delusions are more puzzling than other false or irrational beliefs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Not all belief contents are candidates for explicit endorsement or justification via reason giving. A belief is authored when the subject has better reasons for that belief than against it or better reasons for endorsing it than for suspending judgment (Bortolotti and Broome 2008;Moran 2004). The notion of authorship presupposes that the subject has some sense of control over or responsibility for her belief contents.…”

Section: Delusions As Irrational Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock

Bortolotti¹

2011

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In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not share the same bedrock beliefs as people without (the Background Theory of Delusions).

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Section: Do Theories Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Justifying and Revising Bedrock Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Delusions As Irrational Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock

Bortolotti¹

2011

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“…As far as we can see, however, nothing in the discussion below will hinge on the issue of whether delusions are beliefs or not. 3 With the term 'conscious state', we will refer to states which are phenomenologically salient. We will take actions to be conscious states, thus assuming that there is such a thing as a phenomenology of agency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Schizophrenia and the estranged self

Fernández

Bliss

2016

Evaluation Clinical Practice

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How does schizophrenia affect a subject's sense of self? In this paper, we discuss the experience of alienation of mental states and actions that can take place in schizophrenia. We begin by highlighting this experience in delusions of thought insertion and delusions of made feelings, impulses and actions. Next, we offer a proposal about the nature of this experience by utilizing some of the current philosophical research on self-knowledge. The proposal is that the experience of thoughts, feelings, impulses and actions as not being one's own is the experience of regarding those states as not being responsive to reasons. Then, we put forward a hypothesis about why schizophrenia can lead to this experience by drawing on the psychiatric literature on the disorder. The hypothesis is that subjects who suffer the four delusions are unable to regard some of their thoughts, feelings, impulses and actions as being responsive to reasons because they suffer from a tendency to focus their attention on their own perceptual experiences, as opposed to focusing it on the world. The lesson to draw from the alienation of mental states and actions caused by schizophrenia will be, finally, that two separate components normally make up our sense of self; two components that turn out to be dissociated in the four schizophrenic delusions discussed. These are, on the one hand, the self as the bearer, or host, of mental states and actions and, on the other hand, the self as the owner and agent, respectively, of those mental states and actions.

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Are clinical delusions adaptive?

Lancellotta

Bortolotti

2019

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and dementia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this overview paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their negative features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis? Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psychological, psychiatric, and philosophical literature has recently suggested that they can. We consider different types of delusions and different ways in which they can be considered as adaptive: psychologically (e.g., by increasing wellbeing, purpose in life, intrapsychic coherence, or good functioning) and biologically (e.g., by enhancing genetic fitness). Although further research is needed to map the costs and benefits of adopting and maintaining delusional beliefs, a more nuanced picture of the role of delusions in people's lives has started to emerge.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > RepresentationPhilosophy > Knowledge and BeliefNeuroscience > Cognition

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Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving

Cited by 27 publications

References 37 publications

Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock

Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock

Schizophrenia and the estranged self

Are clinical delusions adaptive?

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