Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives

Abstract

A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question‐directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16

“…If the reasons against an option are really just reasons for alternatives to that option, then we need to say precisely which alternatives. I argue in Snedegar (2018) that there is no good, general answer to this question. For just one example, a reason against A cannot be identified with a reason for each alternative to A, since some alternatives might be even worse in the relevant respect: the fact that restaurant A is crowded is a reason against going there, but it isn't a reason for going to restaurant B instead, if restaurant B is even more crowded (and there are non-crowded alternatives).…”

“…1 and Grotius on law/right vs. counsel in On the Law of War and Peace, Book I, Chapter 1, Section 9. Recent discussions in connection with the issues in this paper includeBedke (2011) andSnedegar (2016). In deontic logic, seeMcNamara (1996).…”

No Reasons to Believe the False

“…The argument I want to discuss in this section focuses on the explanatory function of the notion of outweighed reason. Remember that I am regarding as a constraint on normative reasons that they are intelligible potential premises in our deliberations (Way, ; Snedegar, forthcoming). In particular, it can be argued that the main role of the notion of outweighed normative reason is to contribute to our understanding of weighing deliberations, in which some option is chosen after balancing the weights of the reasons in favor and against the different alternatives (Broome, ).…”

“…Thus, I will not assume that motivating reasons are always normative as well – I will leave open the possibility that merely apparent reasons can function as motivating reasons. However, I will regard as a constraint on normative reasons that they can play a suitable motivating role, more specifically that they can intelligibly intervene as premises in our reasoning and deliberations (for this idea, see Schroeder, ; Way, ; Snedegar, forthcoming).…”

Strategy (Part I): Conceptual Foundations

“…10 10 Snedegar (2019, p. 688) offers some of these suggestions about the uses of partial plans, and their role in deliberation.…”