Deliberation erodes cooperative behavior — Even towards competitive out-groups, even when using a control condition, and even when eliminating selection bias

Everett, Jim A. C.; Ingbretsen, Zachary A.; Cushman, Fiery; Cikara, Mina

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.06.014

Cited by 56 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(49 reference statements)

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“…In sum, our results support the conclusion of Capraro (2017) that time pressure increases honesty in the deception game studied here. This observation is in line with other work where participants can take actions which help or harm others, namely economic cooperation games (Everett et al 2017;Isler et al 2018;Rand 2016). We conclude by suggesting that the Social Heuristic Hypothesis (Bear & Rand, 2016;Peysakhovich & Rand 2016;Rand et al 2014Rand et al , 2016, whereby typically advantageous behaviors are internalized as intuitive defaults, may help explain why -and when -honesty is intuitive versus deliberative.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

Capraro

Schulz

Rand

2019

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

Capraro

Schulz

Rand

2019

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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“…More recently, experimenters have started including all participants in the analysis (Capraro, 2017;Rand, Newman & Wurzbacher, 2015;Tinghög et al, 2015). A third, more radical, solution is to have participants practice in a series of games, before the actual decision, so that they get used to respond quickly, and therefore minimize the proportion of participants who fail to comply to the time pressure (Everett et al, 2017).…”

Section: Time Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More recently, however, Everett, Ingbretsen, Cushman and Cikara (2017) made an important step in the direction of eliminating the methodological limitations of time pressure studies. Everett et al (2017) used a prisoner's dilemma preceded by an extensive warm-up. In this way, Everett et al (2017) were able to reduce non-compliance to time pressure from about 50% in Rand et al (2012) to just 2%.…”

Section: Review Of the Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Everett et al (2017) used a prisoner's dilemma preceded by an extensive warm-up. In this way, Everett et al (2017) were able to reduce non-compliance to time pressure from about 50% in Rand et al (2012) to just 2%. In doing so, they confirmed the result by Rand and colleagues that time pressure has a positive effect on cooperation.…”

Section: Review Of the Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…No effect of Pressure vs Delay on the whole sample. Pressure increases cooperation, among participants who respect the time constraint Everett et al (2017) Prisoner's dilemma Pressure increases cooperation, compared to delay, also towards competitive out-groups Goeschl & Lohse (2018) Public goods game Pressure decreases cooperation Alós-Ferrer & Garagnani (2018) Public goods game Pressure increases cooperation among prosocial participants; Pressure has no effect on individualist participants; Pressure decreases cooperation among competitive participants Bird et al (2019) Public Goods Game among males…”

Section: Dependent Variablementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Dual-Process Approach to Human Sociality: A Review

Capraro¹

2019

SSRN Journal

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Which social decisions are intuitive? Which are deliberative? The dual-process approach to human sociality has emerged in the last decades as a vibrant and exciting area of research. Here, I review the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, honesty, equity-efficiency, positive and negative reciprocity, and moral judgments. For each of these domains, I list a number of open problems that I believe to be crucial to further advance our understanding of human social cognition. I conclude by making an attempt to introduce a game-theoretical framework to organize the existing empirical evidence. This framework seems promising, as it turns out to make predictions that are generally in line with the experimental data in all but one domain: positive reciprocity. I tried to keep the review selfcontained, exhaustive, and research-oriented. My hope is that it can contribute to bring further attention to this fascinating area of research.

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Attachment style predicts cooperation in intuitive but not deliberative response in one‐shot public goods game

et al. 2019

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Cooperation is an important prosocial behaviour that is of great significance to individuals and society. The social heuristics hypothesis (SHH) systematically explains how cooperation is interactively affected by intuitive and deliberative processes. On the one hand, the intuitive process can be either cooperative or selfish, which is determined by previous experience. On the other hand, the deliberative process could support either a cooperative decision or a selfish decision, depending on which strategy could maximise the current payoff. This research aims to investigate the mechanism of cooperation. Attachment style was selected as a proxy for previous experience to examine whether and how previous life experience shapes intuitive response. Time constraint (Studies 1 and 2) and cognitive load (Study 3) were manipulated to dissociate the intuitive and deliberative processes. In addition, cooperation was assessed by adopting one‐shot public goods games. Results showed that attachment avoidance (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and attachment anxiety (Study 3) significantly predicted cooperation in the intuition condition, whereas these associations were insignificant in the deliberation condition (Studies 1, 2, and 3). These findings provide further support for the SHH and shed new light on the mechanism of cooperation.

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Deliberation erodes cooperative behavior — Even towards competitive out-groups, even when using a control condition, and even when eliminating selection bias

Abstract: By many accounts cooperation appears to be a default strategy in social interaction

Cited by 56 publications

References 42 publications

Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

Time pressure and honesty in a deception game

The Dual-Process Approach to Human Sociality: A Review

Attachment style predicts cooperation in intuitive but not deliberative response in one‐shot public goods game

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