Deliberation and confidence change

Heinzelmann, Nora; Hartmann, Stephan

doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03584-3

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…The agent with the extreme belief has defended their view against stronger disagreement than the agent with the moderate belief. It seems plausible, even justified, for the former to become more confident in their belief than the latter (we develop this argument more fully in Heinzelmann and Hartmann (2022); cf. Mill, On Liberty, Book II: 39-40).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Extremists are more confident

Heinzelmann

Tran²

2022

Erkenn

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Metacognitive mental states are mental states about mental states. For example, I may be uncertain whether my belief is correct. In social discourse, an interlocutor’s metacognitive certainty may constitute evidence about the reliability of their testimony. For example, if a speaker is certain that their belief is correct, then we may take this as evidence in favour of their belief or its content. This paper argues that, if metacognitive certainty is genuine evidence, then it is disproportionate evidence for extreme beliefs. In support of the argument, we report findings from five studies with different participant samples, designs, and measures. These studies show that, the more extreme an agent’s belief (positive or negative), the more certain they are about it, and vice versa. This relationship might contribute to moralism, virtue signalling, and polarisation, which in turn may be epistemically and morally problematic. Therefore, we caution against taking metacognitive certainty as genuine evidence.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%