Deliberating across Deep Divides

Luskin, Robert C.; O'Flynn, Ian; Fishkin, James S.; Russell, David

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.01005.x

Cited by 87 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Michael Morrell (2010), in a pioneering study, contends that cognitive empathy (gaining knowledge on the other person's preferences and reasons for that position, juxtaposed against affective empathy which is knowledge of another person's mental state) is driven by reciprocity. Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2014; see also Luskin, O'Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 2014) argue that deliberation acts as a buffer against more negative feelings towards the out-group, and demonstrate this finding in the context of two deliberative experiments in Belgium. These 9 Social learning is a 'group-level change' because it necessitates a dyadic relationship with another agent.…”

Section: Meso-changes: Social Learning Polarization and Consensusmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Undertaking a deliberative poll in Omagh, Northern Ireland, Luskin et al (2014) demonstrated that Catholics and Protestants were able to deliberate meaningfully, gain knowledge of opposing viewpoints, and ultimately support greater intermingling of ideas in policy outputs. Caluwaerts and Ugarriza (2014,), drawing upon nine case studies of divided societies from across the globe, argue that deliberation can lead to conflict resolution when institutions are decentralized (i.e.…”

Section: Macro-changes: Popular Support Deep Divisions and Democratmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deliberative Abilities and Influence in a Transnational Deliberative Poll (EuroPolis)

Gerber¹,

Bächtiger²,

Shikano³

et al. 2016

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Though commanding a prominent role in political theory, deliberative democracy has also become a mainstay of myriad other research traditions in recent years. This diffusion has been propelled along by the notion that deliberation, properly conceived and enacted, generates many beneficial outcomes. This article has three goals geared toward understanding whether these instrumental benefits provide us with good reasons -beyond intrinsic ones -to be deliberative democrats. First, the proclaimed instrumental benefits are systematized in terms of micro, meso, and macro outcomes. Second, relevant literatures are canvassed to critically assess what we know -and what we do not know -about deliberation's effects. Finally, the instrumental benefits of deliberation are recast in light of the ongoing systemic turn in deliberative theory. This article adds to our theoretical understanding of deliberation's promises and pitfalls, and helps practitioners identify gaps in our knowledge concerning how deliberation works and what its wider societal implications might be.

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Section: Meso-changes: Social Learning Polarization and Consensusmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Macro-changes: Popular Support Deep Divisions and Democratmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberative Abilities and Influence in a Transnational Deliberative Poll (EuroPolis)

Gerber¹,

Bächtiger²,

Shikano³

et al. 2016

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Although processing of evidence is culturally biased as described above, there are limits to the degree to which people can pick the evidence that suits them (Kunda 1990). Furthermore, there is evidence (Vinokur & Burnstein 1978;Luskin et al 2012;Cohen et al 2007) that deliberations between adherents of conflicting worldviews or ideologies brings these people closer together with respect to their factual beliefs. Insofar as the willingness (and perhaps even active desire) to engage with the arguments of political opponents is also a part of the public-reason norm, it has resources to diffuse the kind of conflicts that arise from cultural cognition as well.…”

Section: Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Decision Making and the Psychology of Risk

Christiansen

Hallsson

2017

Les ateliers de l'éthique

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Résumé de l'articleDans de nombreux cas, le public (ou une grande partie de celui-ci) veut restreindre une activité ou une technologie qu'il croit être dangereuse, mais que les experts scientifiques considèrent être sécuritaire. Il y a alors une tension entre le respect des préférences des gens et des politiques fondées sur nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques. Décider comment élaborer une politique à la lumière de cette tension nécessite de comprendre pourquoi les citoyens sont parfois en désaccord avec les experts à propos de ce qui est risqué et ce qui est sûr. Dans cet article, nous examinons deux théories très influentes sur la façon dont les gens forment des croyances sur les risques : la théorie selon laquelle les croyances liées au risque sont des erreurs causées par la rationalité limitée et la théorie selon laquelle ces croyances font partie intégrante des systèmes de valeurs fonda-mentales des personnes. Nous discutons ensuite les implications des théories psychologiques pour les questions touchant la prise de décision libérale-démocratique : (1) Les politiques devraient-elles être sensibles aux préférences des citoyens dans le domaine de la régulation des risques? (2) Quelles politiques de régulation des risques sont légitimes? (3) Comment la délibération libérale-démocratique devrait-elle être structurée? ABSTRACT:In many cases, the public (or large parts of it) want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what is safe. In this paper, we examine two highly influential theories of how people form beliefs about risks: the theory that risk beliefs are errors caused by bounded rationality and the theory that such beliefs are part and parcel of people's core value systems. We then discuss the implications of the psychological theories for questions regarding liberal-democratic decision making: (1) Should policy be responsive to the preferences of citizens in the domain of risk regulation? (2) What risk-regulation policies are legitimate? (3) How should liberal-democratic deliberation be structured? RÉSUMÉ :Dans de nombreux cas, le public (ou une grande partie de celui-ci) veut restreindre une activité ou une technologie qu'il croit être dangereuse, mais que les experts scientifiques considèrent être sécuritaire. Il y a alors une tension entre le respect des préférences des gens et des politiques fondées sur nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques. Décider comment élaborer une politique à la lumière de cette tension nécessite de comprendre pourquoi les citoyens sont parfois en désaccord avec les experts à propos de ce qui est risqué et ce qui est sûr. Dans cet article, nous examinons deux théories très influentes sur la façon dont les...

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“…But understanding why they are misplaced can itself add to the legitimacy of a decision (Mill 1991(Mill [1861, 282). It can help people to see more clearly why the decision went one way rather than another, and hence increase their confidence in the epistemic merits of the decision (Cohen 1986;Estlund 2007;Luskin et al 2014). …”

Section: Why Take a Deliberative Approach?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberative democratization: a framework for systemic analysis

O'Flynn

Curato

2015

Policy Studies

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In the transition literature, 'free and fair elections' is often treated as the most important indicator of democratic quality. In this paper, however, we argue that 'free deliberation among equals' is in many respects a more telling measure. On the face of it, this argument might strike one as implausible. After all, the decisive moment in many transitions is the signing of a pact between elements in the government and opposition who are more concerned to protect their own interests than to explain themselves to others. Yet while pacts may not be particularly deliberative, they still occasion a great deal of deliberation across society as a whole. We argue that the different sites where deliberation occurs can be understood as forming a deliberative system. To give substance to this idea, we then outline a systemic framework that may be used to describe and evaluate the deliberative capacity of transitional regimes. Finally, we turn to the cases of Venezuela and Poland to illustrate the empirical application of this approach. Both transitions were founded on a pact. Yet differences in the nature of those pacts and the broader deliberative systems in which they were located tell us a lot about where those countries are today. The comparative study of democratic transitions is one of the most vibrant areas of academic study in politics. The reasons why are obvious enough. The huge social and political upheavals that lead to the collapse of authoritarian regimes need to be explained. We need to know more about the conditions under which transitions to democracy are likely to occur and about the conditions under which democratic deepening is likely to take hold. These questions are not merely academic but have crucial policy implications. The international community spends billions of dollars every year on democracy promotion across the globe.Yet while lives are put at risk in both wars and popular demonstrations waged in the name of democracy, the fact remains that many transition countries fail to make the democratic grade.Despite the best efforts of the democracy promotion community to devise more effective policies, many countries seem to be stuck in what Thomas Carothers terms a 'grey zone'.They display some of the attributes of democratic political life, including opposition parties, civil associations and periodic elections, but they are also marked by persistent abuses of the rule of law, widespread corruption, low levels of public participation between elections, poor institutional performance by the state, and low levels of trust in government (Carothers 2002, 9-10; see also Rose and Chin 2001).Granted, assessing a transition's democratic quality is notoriously difficult. In no small part, what makes it so difficult is the fact that 'transition' and 'democracy' can be defined in different ways. Consequently, scholars can have very different, and sometimes competing, ideas about which factors are important in assessing how far a country has or has not come (Diamond et al. 2014, 87-98). In this ar...

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Deliberating across Deep Divides

Cited by 87 publications

References 14 publications

Deliberative Abilities and Influence in a Transnational Deliberative Poll (EuroPolis)

Deliberative Abilities and Influence in a Transnational Deliberative Poll (EuroPolis)

Democratic Decision Making and the Psychology of Risk

Deliberative democratization: a framework for systemic analysis

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